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This thesis analyzes international animal law, understood broadly as any international legal regulation pertaining to animals. 
The purpose of the thesis is to explain the moral implications of this branch of international law: how the law perceives the 
animal and how it believes animals ought to be treated. It attempts to do so by contrasting the law with moral philosophy 
pertaining to the status and treatment of animals as well as the core characteristics of the branch of animal law found in 
many contemporary societies. 
 
International animal law does not conform to any single set of rules or principles. Rather, it comprises a wide range of 
human behavior in relation to animals, ranging from the use and management of natural resources to the treatment of 
animals in animal agriculture. What follows is that international animal law can, in broad terms, be divided into three spheres 
of regulation. 
 
In the first sphere, animals are considered resources. The law here is about regulating the use and conservation of natural 
resources of the world, both terrestrial and marine. While some exceptions have been made in favor of certain animal 
species, this sphere of regulation is largely insensitive to any non-instrumental value animals could be seen as having. 
Moreover, the characterization of animals as resources leads to an absence of standards regulating how these resources 
should be treated as a practical matter. Under this sphere of international animal law, humans are justified in using animals 
as means to human ends, and that is the end of the matter: there is nothing that the law prescribes or proscribes in relation 
to the well-being of the used resources. 
 
In the second sphere, international animal law takes an interest in certain animals as members of a particular species. Here, 
the main purpose of the law is to conserve and protect endangered species from extinction. This is given effect in many 
ways, such as regulating trade in endangered species or protecting the habitats of wild animals. While prima facie more 
compassionate than the viewing of animals as resources, it is clear that this branch of conservation law excludes most 
animals from consideration: for the most part, only those animals having unfavorable conservation status or otherwise in 
need of protection from conduct detrimental to their survival are deemed worthy of protection. The law of this sphere is also 
ultimately peripheral to most ways in which humans and animals interact as an empirical matter. In focusing on specific 
problems associated with specific species of animals, the law does not amount to any general rules and principles guiding 
human behavior in regard to animals. 
 
Finally, the third sphere of international animal law conceives of animals as individuals. Largely associated with the concept 
of animal welfare, this sphere is interested in regulating how the well-being of individual animals should be taken into 
account in human practices. The law here is markedly sporadic, however. There are no legally binding global standards 
governing animal welfare. The most widespread and developed instruments in this regard are regional, and European 
states in particular have been active in ensuring the well-being of individual animals through international legal instruments. 
As this sphere of international animal law is mostly concerned about the welfare of animals in the context of their 
exploitation, it is largely in line with the philosophy of the theory of animal welfare, which animates most animal law in 
domestic jurisdictions. In practical terms, animals may be used instrumentally as long as they are treated ‘humanely’ and 
not subjected to ‘unnecessary suffering’. 
 
As it is clear that there is no single, unified body of international animal law, it is equally clear that there is no single set of 
moral principles behind its rules. The ethics of treating animals as resources are markedly different from the ethics of 
regulating animal welfare in animal agriculture. The common denominator of the three distinct spheres of the law, however, 
is that all of them ultimately promote the instrumental value of animals. As animals do not enjoy meaningful legal rights in 
any contemporary society, neither do they have legal rights under international law. International animal law, by and large, 
emphasizes animals’ instrumental value, firmly rejecting, however implicitly, any notion of inherent value or moral rights. 
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1 
I INTRODUCTION 
Is it not a reproach that man is a carnivorous animal? True, he can and does live, 
in a great measure, by preying on other animals; but this is a miserable way,—as 
any one who will go to snaring rabbits, or slaughtering lambs, may learn,—and he 
will be regarded as a benefactor of his race who shall teach man to confine 
himself to a more innocent and wholesome diet. Whatever my own practice may 
be, I have no doubt that it is a part of the destiny of the human race, in its gradual 
improvement, to leave off eating animals, as surely as the savage tribes have left 
off eating each other when they came in contact with the more civilized.1 
It is difficult to resist the conclusion that Thoreau’s vision is hardly closer to realization today 
than it was during his lifetime. If anything, human exploitation of animals is more prevalent 
now than ever before in recorded history. To give the phenomenon some sense of scale, 2011 
statistics from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations evidence that the 
global amount of terrestrial animals slaughtered that year was roughly 64 billion2. The total 
world catch of fish was estimated to be 90 million tonnes as early as 19923, and the level of 
                                                 
1 Henry David Thoreau, Walden; or, life in the woods (Ticknor and Fields 1854) 232. 
2 FAO, ‘Global livestock production and health atlas’ <http://kids.fao.org/glipha/> accessed 10 July 2014. The 
estimated figure of 64 billion consists of 24 million buffaloes, 1.6 million camels, 293 million cattle, 57 billion 
chickens, 2.9 billion ducks, 649 million geese, 410 million goats, 4.5 million horses, 484 million sheep, 656 million 
turkeys, and, since the 2011 statistics do not account for asses, mules, and pigs but the 2010 statistics do, an 
estimate of (assuming no growth between 2010 and 2011) 2.4 million asses, 561 million mules, and 1.3 billion 
pigs. 
3 Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, International law and the environment (2nd edn, OUP 2002) 646. 
2 
exploitation has remained more or less steady since4. A 2008 report estimated that the total 
amount of animals involved in scientific research and related practices was in the range of 115 
million in 2005, uses varying from tissue supply and the maintaining of breeding colonies to 
killing surplus specimens insofar as the amount bred exceeds requirements5. Ultimately, of 
course, animal exploitation is not only about the numbers. Few would praise modern intensive 
farming methods as compassionate or conducive to a high standard of animal welfare (a 
flexible concept in itself, as we shall see). Most animals involved in so-called factory farming 
never spend time outdoors and are generally incapable of engaging in behavior natural to their 
species.6 All things considered, it is fair to say that human societies thrive on the exploitation 
of animals, and nothing suggests that the amount of animals used as means for human ends 
would be on the decline. 
However, as the introduction of so-called anticruelty and animal welfare laws 7  and their 
continuing prevalence suggests, some holds are barred today. As we shall see, such laws began 
to enter the stage during the 19th century and were greatly inspired by utilitarian philosophy, 
Jeremy Bentham’s works in particular. But we shall also see that the moral underpinnings of 
these laws are increasingly being called into question by contemporary philosophers, lawyers, 
and animal activists. Radical two hundred years ago, they now represent a mode of thought 
that, while still alive and well in contemporary societies and legal systems, is increasingly 
considered outdated and in dire need of reform or, more dramatically, complete abolition. 
The regulation of animal exploitation, health, and welfare is not limited to domestic law. As 
early as the 1930’s, treaties were concluded to address, for example, the international transit of 
animals and animal products8 . These treaties, however, focused largely on preventing the 
                                                 
4 See FAO, ‘Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, etc—world capture production’ 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/STAT/summary/a1a.pdf> accessed 16 August 2014. 
5 See generally Katy Taylor and others, ‘Estimates for worldwide laboratory animal use in 2005’ (2008) 36 
Alternatives to Laboratory Animals 327. 
6  Gaverick Matheny and Cheryl Leahy, ‘Farm-animal welfare, legislation, and trade’ (2007) 70 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 325, 326, 329. 
7 In broad terms, anticruelty laws impose negative obligations to refrain from certain kinds of acts (eg infliction 
of gratuitous suffering) whereas welfare laws impose positive obligations (prima facie) conducive to a high 
standard of well-being. See Mike Radford, Animal welfare law in Britain : regulation and responsibility (OUP 2001) 6; 
Joan E Schaffner, An introduction to animals and the law (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 71; Visa Kurki, ‘Tarvitaanko 
eläinten oikeuksia? Eläinten oikeussubjektiviteetin mahdollisuus ja hyödyt’ (LLM thesis, Edita Publishing 2012) 
16–7. 
8 See International convention concerning the transit of animals, meat and other products of animal origin 
(adopted 20 February 1935, entered into force 6 December 1938) 193 LNTS 37; International convention 
concerning the export and import of animal products (other than meat, meat preparations, fresh animal products, 
milk and milk products) (adopted 20 February 1935, entered into force 6 December 1938) 193 LNTS 59. 
3 
spreading of animal diseases and, due to the low number of ratifications they received, never 
became truly significant in their own right9. Since then, the scope of regulation has expanded 
considerably. Today, international law regulates not only some of the most economically 
lucrative forms of exploitation such as fishing but also the protection of habitats, the 
conservation of both individual and groups of animal species, and biological diversity in 
general. 
It is important to understand, however, that law is not the only normative system that takes an 
interest in the treatment of animals. More than two thousand years of moral philosophy on 
the point serves to evidence that normative principles and guidelines existed long before the 
law became concerned with the pain and suffering of nonhuman life. Despite the insuperable 
gap that prima facie sets law apart from morals, it is clear, as will be discussed later in this 
thesis, that the law, as it pertains to animals, has at every turn been both inspired and 
informed by moral philosophy. From absence of any safeguards to prohibiting certain forms 
of exploitation unconditionally, animal law has always reflected the dominant moral ideologies 
contemporary with it. 
Some, like Hans Kelsen, believe that the role of a legal scientist is merely to ‘know and 
describe’ the law, not to ‘justify [it] by absolute or relative morals’10. Others leave room for 
critique on moral grounds even as they hold that law is law even if it happens to be immoral11. 
A lawyer, in the strictest sense of the word, may be comfortable in confining herself within the 
sphere of law while excluding all moral considerations, but not all lawyers—much less moral 
philosophers and animal activists—choose to respect such boundaries. Besides, there is good 
reason to believe that international law itself must, as Donald Childress would say, ‘be self-
critical and seek to evaluate the ethical ground from which it springs.’12 I believe there is a 
need not only to study the black letter of international animal law, but also the moral 
underpinnings and implications of its rules. To interpret and systematize these rules wholly 
apart from morals will only result in half a picture. A comprehensive view requires that one 
expands the scope of inquiry to also include the questions of how international law views 
                                                 
9 See MJ Bowman, ‘The protection of animals under international law’ (1988–1989) 4 Connecticut Journal of 
International Law 487, 489. 
10 Hans Kelsen, Pure theory of law (Max Knight tr, Lawbook Exchange 2005) 68–9. 
11 See HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the separation of law and morals’ (1957) 71 Harvard Law Review 593, 618; 
HLA Hart, The concept of law (2nd edn, OUP 1994) 203, 210. 
12 Donald Earl Childress III, ‘Introduction’ in Donald Earl Childress III (ed), The role of ethics in international law 
(CUP 2012) 4. 
4 
nonhuman animals, what it considers an acceptable standard for their treatment, and what 
moral implications follow. 
Grounding myself on animal ethics and animal law, I argue that international animal law, if 
such a branch can be said to exist, is not a unified and consistent field of public international 
law, but rather a body of overlapping spheres of regulation that take wildly differing 
perspectives to what animals are, why they are of interest, and how they ought to be treated. 
From labeling nonhuman life ‘natural resources’ to protecting individual farm animals from 
improper treatment, international animal law comprises an ever-growing number of treaties 
and other legal instruments regulating a wide range of practices involving animals. What is 
common to this otherwise diverse body of regulation, however, is that the law, by and large, 
views animals as things that may be used instrumentally to satisfy human interests. Apart from 
some high-minded declarations and preamble recitals, nothing in international animal law 
currently serves to suggest that animals would have inherent value regardless of their utility to 
humans or rights of any kind. 
Research question 
This thesis, as its very title suggests, is a study of the ethics of international animal law—its 
attitude towards nonhuman life, its debt to moral philosophy, the moral implications of its 
rules and institutions. The central research question that has informed my work is this: does 
international animal law conform to moral philosophy regarding animals, and if so, how? 
Answering this question requires, firstly, a firm footing in moral philosophy—as William 
Ewald once implied, albeit in a context very different from the present one, one cannot truly 
understand a legal system without inquiring into the philosophical principles lying behind its 
rules13. From ancient Greece to contemporary America, and practically any imaginable time 
and place in between, philosophers have sought to understand what animals are, how they 
differ from us, and how they should be treated. The body of literature existing on these points 
is vast and continues to expand at a rate that would hardly have been conceivable a few 
decades (much less centuries) ago. The purpose here is to draw from this literature, but not to 
contribute to it. There is no reason to believe that any particular philosopher would thus far 
have gotten the final word in the debate; the fact that one of the most influential contributions 
                                                 
13 cf William Ewald, ‘Comparative jurisprudence (I): what was it like to try a rat?’ (1994–1995) 143 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1889, 1896. 
5 
of the 20th century, Tom Regan’s The case for animal rights—a book responsible for inspiring 
immense amounts of literature on the concept of moral rights of animals— was published no 
longer than three decades ago underlines this point well. There is no reason to believe that 
moral philosophy pertaining to animals would be fully developed so as to exclude the 
possibility of new approaches and theories. Yet while it is possible to formulate something 
new still, this is not the place for it.  
Secondly, a firm footing in animal law is required. This relatively new subject of academic 
interest has expanded greatly over the last two decades or so. As Joyce Tischler has noted, the 
amount of animal law classes taught in American law schools increased from about ten in 
2000 to almost one-and-a-half hundred in 2012 14 . Gary Francione has made a similar 
observation, noting that there is an ever-growing scholarly interest in animal matters15. Today, 
animal law is taught at roughly a hundred law schools in the United States and also in a 
number of other countries as culturally and politically diverse as China, Israel, and the United 
Kingdom16. No Finnish university, surprisingly, offers courses in the subject—an unfortunate 
shortcoming hopefully to be rectified in the years to come. Moreover, while the first-ever 
academic journal on animal law, Lewis & Clark Law School’s Animal Law, was founded in 
1994, today a much greater number of journals contribute to legal scholarship and academic 
debate on the subject, the most recent addition being the Global Journal of Animal Law from 
the University of Turku, Finland. Yet here, too, my purpose is merely to draw from existing 
literature insofar as is relevant for my argument without making any contributions of my own. 
The intricacies of animal law are best understood when analyzed in the light of moral 
philosophy; these two, combined, will allow me to carry out my primary research task, which 
is to understand the ethics of international animal law. 
As literature on animal law continues to proliferate, there is surprisingly little literature on 
international animal law. Few works concentrate on animals per se17; for the most part, the status 
and treatment of animals is subsumed under a broader topic such as conservation of natural 
                                                 
14 Joyce Tischler, ‘A brief history of animal law, part II (1985–2011)’ (2012) 5 Stanford Journal of Animal Law 
and Policy 27, 37. 
15 See Gary L Francione, ‘Reflections on Animals, property, and the law and Rain without thunder’ (2007) 70 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 9, 47. 
16 See Ed Mussawir and Yoriko Otomo, ‘Law’s animal’ in Yoriko Otomo and Ed Mussawir (eds), Law and the 
question of the animal : a critical jurisprudence (Routledge 2013) 1. 
17 See eg Bowman, ‘The protection of animals under international law’ (n 9) who contemplates the lack of a truly 
global instrument comprehensively regulating animal welfare, and Catherine Sykes, ‘The beasts in the jungle: 
animal welfare in international law’ (LLM thesis, Dalhousie University 2011), who explores the legal status of a 
‘humane treatment principle’. 
6 
resources, biological diversity, or international environmental law in general18. Consequently, 
animals are rarely considered at a micro level. Instead of focusing on individual specimens, 
animals are referred to through their species or simply as natural resources. This is 
understandable, of course, as international law is first and foremost a system governing the 
conduct of sovereign states 19 . Since the legal order adopts a (prima facie) macro-level 
perspective already in regard to its subjects 20 , it is only natural that the same scope is 
maintained as regards the objects of its rules. Still, the general failure of international law (and 
scholarship thereof) to conceive of animals as individuals runs the risk of blinding the 
spectator from the micro-level implications of its rules. As a matter of morals, individuals do 
matter. 
A macro-level perspective in regard to animals entails that inquiries into the moral aspects of 
international animal law similarly avoid asking how individual animals ought to be treated. 
Much of the discussion seems to revolve around thoughts on whether certain species are 
‘different’ enough to justify better (or worse) treatment 21 . Some, because animals can be 
understood as part of the environment or biological diversity, approach the topic through 
environmental ethics22. The few who draw more directly from the terminology and theory of 
animal ethics generally limit the scope of their inquiry to one particular legal instrument or 
species of animal 23 . During my work, I have found no contributions that would read 
international animal law together with the whole range of moral theories on animals and the 
core tenets of animal law to, as I seek to do, unveil from where the law derives its inspiration. 
Nor have I discovered any materials that would seek to make a case on the ethics of 
international animal law as a whole, that is, making generalizations so as to present how the 
international legal system views animals and the ethics of their treatment in broad terms, 
beyond the confines of any single context, legal instrument, or species. Existing literature on 
international animal law does not, therefore, answer the research question of this thesis. In 
                                                 
18 Eg Birnie and Boyle (n 3); Alexander Gillespie, Conservation, biodiversity and international law (Edward Elgar 2011). 
19 See SS ‘Lotus’ (France v Turkey) PCIJ Rep Series A No 10, 18. 
20 Prima facie because, as some scholars have argued, individual human beings could (and perhaps also should) be 
considered subjects of international law. See Hersch Lauterpacht, International law and human rights (Stevens & Sons 
1950) 72 as cited in Robert McCorquodale, ‘The individual and the international legal system’ in Malcolm D 
Evans (ed), International law (3rd edn, OUP 2010) 287. 
21 See Erik Jaap Molenaar, ‘Marine mammals: the role of ethics and ecosystem considerations’ (2003) 6 Journal of 
International Wildlife Law and Policy 31, 35; Gillespie, Conservation, biodiversity and international law (n 18) 139–42. 
22 See generally Christopher D Stone, ‘Ethics and international environmental law’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta 
Brunnée, and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford handbook of international environmental law (OUP 2007). 
23 Eg Nina Nordström and others, Johdatus kansainväliseen ympäristöoikeuteen (Lakimiesliiton Kustannus 1994) 76; 
Alexander Gillespie, ‘Whaling under a scientific auspice: the ethics of scientific research whaling operations’ 
(2000) 3 Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy 1. 
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seeking to answer that question, the present work attempts to fill a gap in existing knowledge 
by assuming a perspective that is mindful of the fact that animals are individual life forms the 
treatment of which has moral implications24. In doing so, it seeks to offer a contribution to 
our current understanding of international law by explaining what the rules of that system 
mean for animals, both at the micro and macro levels. 
Method and sources 
It must be admitted from the outset that this is a positivist thesis. ‘The existence of a law is one 
thing: its merits or demerits are another’, as John Austin once observed—it is one thing, then, 
to inquire what the law is, but a wholly different matter to inquire what it ought to be25. To 
embrace the separation of law and morals of classical positivist theory does not, as was noted 
above, preclude one from judging the law on moral grounds26. It is simply to accept the 
postulate that law is valid regardless of its conformity to moral standards. Immoral laws may 
exist, though which set of moral principles should be used as the yardstick is a matter open to 
debate.27 What is permissible under the law might not conform to moral principles, and vice 
versa28. 
While morals may be inconsequential for the validity of law, there is some connection between 
the two, on this many agree29. Some hold that the law is influenced by moral attitudes30, others 
turn the matter around and stress the former’s capacity to influence change in the latter31. 
Moreover, there is considerable variety in how legal scholars approach questions concerning 
the ethics of a particular branch of law, and no single view seems to have a monopoly on how 
these two prima facie distinct concepts are to be reconciled. Donald Childress, in the context 
of international law, has held that ethical considerations are implicitly present in any attempt 
                                                 
24 cf Bowman, ‘The protection of animals under international law’ (n 9) 488. 
25 See John Austin, The province of jurisprudence determined (John Murray 1832) 278 (emphases omitted). 
26 See n 11. See also Thomas G Kelch, ‘Toward a non-property status for animals’ (1997–1998) 6 New York 
University Environmental Law Journal 531, 555. 
27 See Hart, The concept of law (n 11) 185; Kelsen (n 10) 67–8. 
28 See Tom Regan, The case for animal rights (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1983) 394. cf Antonio Cassese, ‘Ex iniuria ius 
oritur: are we moving towards international legitimation of forcible humanitarian countermeasures in the world 
community?’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 23, 25. 
29 Eg Richard A Posner, ‘The problematics of moral and legal theory’ (1997–1998) 111 Harvard Law Review 
1637, 1695; Simo S Oja, ‘Onko eläimillä oikeuksia? Eläinkoelainsäädännön kehitys ja nykytila’ (PhD thesis, 
University of Helsinki 2011) 82–3. 
30 See Hart, The concept of law (n 11) 185, 200, 203–4; Posner (n 29) 1694. 
31 See Farhana Yamin, ‘Biodiversity, ethics and international law’ (1995) 71 International Affairs 529, 535; Simon 
Brooman and Debbie Legge, Law relating to animals (Cavendish Publishing 1997) 27–8; Susan Finsen, ‘Obstacles 
to legal rights for animals : can we get there from here?’ (1997) 3 Animal Law i, iv. 
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to determine what rule of law should be applied to a particular dispute32. Jan Klabbers is 
interested in the role virtue could play in practical working of international law33. For others, 
ethics is about compliance: why and how states come to decide whether they comply or fail to 
comply with their international obligations34. My approach, by comparison, is relatively simple: 
as stated above, I merely seek to read international legal instruments pertaining to animals 
together with animal ethics to discover whether any meaningful connections exist between the 
two. 
That said, describing an academic work as ‘positivist’ does not, I believe, satisfactorily describe 
just how a researcher intends to arrive at whatever truth she is seeking. It does go some way 
towards explaining where exactly the researcher intends to find the law, of course. In this 
regard, I understand the sources of international law as those formal sources listed in article 
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ statute’), that is: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law.35 
A firm rooting in formal sources of law is necessary for any work of legal science36. These are 
the materials that, insofar as they pertain to animals, constitute the international animal law I 
seek to understand. Still, a commitment to a particular doctrine of sources does not describe 
the practical approaches and techniques used in a scientific work in any greater detail than 
designating a work as ‘positivist’. It follows that something further must be said about the 
method(s) used in this work. 
                                                 
32 See Childress (n 12) 2. 
33 See Jan Klabbers, International law (CUP 2013) 312–3. 
34 See generally eg Roger P Alford and James Fallows Tierney, ‘Moral reasoning in international law’ in Donald 
Earl Childress III (ed), The role of ethics in international law (CUP 2012); Oona A Hathaway, ‘Between power and 
principle’ in Donald Earl Childress III (ed), The role of ethics in international law (CUP 2012). 
35 (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945). 
36 See Aulis Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria (Werner Söderström 1989) 195. 
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According to Ari Hirvonen, there is no one single accepted method in legal science37. Any 
choice of a method is sensitive to the task at hand: a change in the problem being researched 
may necessitate a change of method38. Furthermore, no method available to the scientist is 
automatic in a sense that one would merely need to input the relevant data and then wait for 
the method to extract the correct results as if the science would be some kind of a mechanic 
procedure39. I have come to accept that the best way to go about describing one’s method is 
simply to describe what steps one intends to take and which tools to use as simply and as 
transparently as possible—attempt this I now shall. Since my research tasks differ greatly from 
one chapter to another, it will be practical to explain my approach one chapter at a time. 
In chapter II, I examine moral philosophy as it pertains to the status and treatment of animals. 
As said above, the intention has not been to contribute to existing literature on the point, so I 
have been content with arriving to an understanding of various theoretical positions and being 
able to express them concisely and in a manner consistent with the purpose of this thesis. 
Chapter II, therefore, draws predominantly from literature on animal ethics and focuses on a 
number of select theories that best represent the respective branches of thought they belong 
to. The choice of materials and other relevant details will be discussed further at the beginning 
of the chapter, but at this stage it will suffice to say that we shall move from theories holding 
animals as morally irrelevant to theories not only positing that animals matter morally but that 
animals and humans are moral equals; from one extreme to another, as it were. 
Chapter III focuses on the legal implications of animal use. The purpose of this chapter is to 
deepen the understanding of the moral implications of animal use acquired in chapter II by 
contrasting the philosophy with the law. The emphasis is largely theoretical: instead of 
focusing on the interpretation of legal instruments, the focus is on understanding the theory 
that animates the law. As such, chapter III will draw largely from literature on animal law and 
supplement scientific sources with examples of legal instruments insofar as is necessary. As 
the purpose of this thesis is not to contribute to existing debate on animal law either, chapter 
III simply constitutes the latter half of the development of a theoretical framework which will 
                                                 
37  See Ari Hirvonen, Mitkä metodit? Opas oikeustieteen metodologiaan 7 
<http://www.helsinki.fi/oikeustiede/tutkimus_ja_julkaisut/julkaisut/yleinen_oikeustiede/hirvonen_mitka_meto
dit.pdf> accessed 14 August 2014. 
38 cf Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, ‘Rikosoikeustutkimus, kriminaalipoliittinen orientaatio—ja metodi’ in Juha Häyhä (ed), 
Minun metodini (Werner Söderström Lakitieto 1997) 189. 
39 See Aulis Aarnio, ‘Oikeussäännösten systematisointi ja tulkinta’ in Juha Häyhä (ed), Minun metodini (Werner 
Söderström Lakitieto 1997) 35. 
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permit the ‘ethical’ reading of international animal law in chapter IV. To summarize, we shall 
begin from the theory of animal welfare, contrast it with its polar opposite, animal rights 
theory, and also discuss a number of intermediary positions for the sake of completeness. 
In contrast to chapters II and III, the main emphasis of chapter IV is with analyzing legal 
instruments. In this regard, the central method of chapter IV is legal dogmatics: the purpose is 
to analyze the content of legal norms in force40. However, the purpose, as has been stated, is 
not only to interpret the law from a perspective internal to the law, but to look beyond the 
strictly legal implications of norms into what their moral implications are. In this sense, my 
method is something different, something more than legal dogmatics. Perhaps my approach 
lies somewhere between legal dogmatics and ‘law and ethics’, since the examination of the 
moral implications of the law is necessarily connected, at least on some level, to a question of 
whether the norms examined are just41. 
Above, I stated my commitment to article 38 of the ICJ statute as an expression of the formal 
sources from which the rules of international law (exhaustively 42) flow. A few additional 
remarks are now in order. The sheer amount of international legal materials pertaining to 
animals make it, as will be reiterated in chapter IV, impossible to attempt to account for any 
and all legal norms within present constraints. International animal law should, of course, be 
so construed as to contain all legal instruments and rules having anything to do with animals. 
The amount of relevant treaties alone, however, is remarkable. As we move from treaties to 
other formal sources of international law—namely customary law and general principles of 
law—, certain problems arise. Customary law, as is well-established, consists of two elements: 
general, uniform, and consistent state practice, and the psychological element of opinio juris sive 
necessitatis, that is, the fact that states engage in practice because they believe they are legally 
obligated to do so rather than acting out of mere habit43. Proving the existence of a customary 
rule of international law requires remarkable empirical proof of both practice and the attitude 
of states animating said practice. Given these difficulties (and the abundance of available 
                                                 
40 cf Hirvonen (n 37) 22. 
41 cf ibid 29. 
42 cf Hugh Thirlway, ‘The sources of international law’ in Malcolm D Evans (ed), International law (3rd edn, OUP 
2010) 98–9. 
43 See North Sea continental shelf (Germany v Denmark, Germany v Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, para 77; Continental 
shelf (Libya v Malta) [1985] ICJ Rep 13, para 27; Military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
USA) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 207; Thirlway (n 42) 102. 
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treaties), I have elected to leave customary rules outside my scope of inquiry; to prove the 
existence of one customary obligation alone would be a challenge for any Master’s thesis. 
Turning to ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’, there are various theories 
as to what these principles are, but most scholars would agree that such principles can be 
located by means of comparative law in the domestic legal systems of sovereign states. The 
general idea is that the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) may, when facing a situation of 
non liquet, apply principles found in domestic systems by way of analogy.44 It is obvious that 
evidencing such principles is just as—if not more—empirically challenging as proving the 
existence of wide-spread state practice and opinio juris. Moreover, the task of evidencing a 
general principle of law by studying domestic legal systems brings the researcher close to 
shifting from the academic discipline of public international law to that of private international 
law and comparative law. Again, as there is an abundance of treaty regimes as it is, I have 
elected to leave general principles of law outside the scope of my work. In studying 
international animal law, I thus focus on treaties. Which treaties exactly I have chosen for 
scrutiny will be explained in the beginning of chapter IV. 
Thomas Wilhelmsson has argued that any researcher taking her work seriously must always 
seek clarity in regard to what she is doing and constantly ask herself how she perceives the 
law45. In this section, I have tried, to the best of my ability, to live up to Wilhelmsson’s criteria. 
I have expressed my commitment to legal positivism and article 38 of the ICJ statute as an 
authoritative list of the sources of international law. I have attempted to be as clear and as 
transparent as possible about my approach, describing how I seek to combine the study of 
moral philosophy and a (mostly) theoretical study of animal law with a dogmatic (but also 
ethical) analysis of international (treaty) law as it pertains to animals. Seeing as how I have not 
committed myself to using any single method to the exclusion of all others, but rather 
combine several approaches, my method could, perhaps, best be described as eclectic.  
Terms and concepts 
As this thesis will make use of a number of terms and concepts that do not belong to the 
everyday parlance of public international law, it is best a few words of clarification are said 
                                                 
44 See Thirlway (n 42) 108–9; Klabbers, International law (n 33) 25, 34. 
45 Thomas Wilhelmsson, ‘Sosiaalisen siviilioikeuden metodiset lähtökohdat’ in Juha Häyhä (ed), Minun metodini 
(Werner Söderström Lakitieto 1997) 355. 
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prior to moving on to chapter II. The first remark connects to the very objects of the present 
study: ‘animals’. What exactly is included in this category of beings? Taxonomically, humans 
are as just as much ‘animal’ as, say, geese. Both belong to the same kingdom and phylum, 
Animalia and Chordata respectively. Humans, however, belong to the class Mammalia, 
whereas geese belong to the class Aves. Despite minor differences in terms of taxa, humans, 
then, are animals, but when we refer to ‘animals’, we generally refer to every species of animals 
except humans46. Some authors attempt to soften this great divide by speaking of ‘nonhuman 
animals’. The logic is, apparently, that humans are ‘human animals’ whereas all other animals 
are ‘nonhuman animals’. There is some appeal to this approach, but as Katie Sykes has 
pointed out, it runs the risk of making ‘the argument less persuasive to all but the already 
converted’.47 Lisa Kemmerer attempts to remedy this linguistic problem by coining the term 
‘anymal’, ‘anymal’ being the equivalent of ‘nonhuman animal’ for all practical purposes48. That 
said, for the remainder of this thesis I will prefer ‘animal’ for the sake of brevity and simplicity, 
aware as I am that some might consider such an assignment of all of nonhuman life under a 
single unifying category amounting to an ‘asinanity’, a denial of one’s own animality and a 
direct contribution to the ‘war of the species’49. Yet I have no such designs; those bothered by 
my choice of words may freely substitute ‘animal’ with ‘nonhuman animal’ or ‘anymal’ each 
time they encounter the word in this work. Besides, I believe the ethical and legal perspectives 
examined in chapters II and III will speak for themselves loud and clear enough to dissipate 
such worries. 
What, then, is ‘animal law’? Joan Schaffner defines the term as ‘legal doctrine in which the 
legal, social or biological nature of nonhuman animals is an important factor.’ 50  Jordan 
Curnutt’s take is more simple: ‘animal law’ is the ‘set of legal rules governing human practices 
that involve animals’51. Not surprisingly (seeing as animal law is not taught at any Finnish 
universities), the verbatim translation of ‘animal law’ into Finnish—eläinoikeus—has not 
received any determinate meaning thus far; besides, due to the intricacies of Finnish language, 
the term is easily confusable with eläinten oikeudet—‘animal rights’. At any rate, when I refer to 
‘animal law’, I refer to the (domestic and predominantly Western) body of legal rules and 
                                                 
46 Schaffner, An introduction to animals and the law (n 7) 6. 
47 Sykes, ‘The beasts in the jungle: animal welfare in international law’ (n 17) 1. 
48 See Lisa Kemmerer, In search of consistency: ethics and animals (Brill 2006) 10. 
49 See Jacques Derrida, The animal that therefore I am (Marie-Louise Mallet ed, David Wills tr, Fordham University 
Press 2008) 31. 
50 Schaffner, An introduction to animals and the law (n 7) 4–5. 
51 Jordan Curnutt, Animals and the law : a sourcebook (ABC-CLIO 2001) 2. 
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doctrine pertaining to the status and use of animals. While I would be ready to adopt a very 
broad reading of the term, encompassing practically any legal rules that have anything 
whatsoever to do with animals, the term, as will be seen in chapter III, is mostly used in the 
context of anticruelty and welfare statutes and a small number of core doctrines, namely the 
one according to which animals are viewed as property. As regards ‘international animal law’, I 
adopt a similarly broad definition: notwithstanding the scope of this thesis being limited to a 
number of treaties, I understand ‘international animal law’ as meaning any international legal 
regulation pertaining to animals. 
Turning to ethics, insofar as I occasionally refer to ‘animal ethics’, I simply mean any moral 
theories that contribute to the debate concerning the moral status and acceptable treatment of 
animals. I do not, as Christopher Stone perhaps would, exclude from ‘animal ethics proper’ 
those theories that place animals firmly under human dominance and permit practically any 
kind of treatment, no matter how cruel52. Surely there is room for all relevant theories under 
the umbrella term regardless of how naïve, animistic, or immoral the contesting extremes 
might consider each other? 
Finally, chapter III in particular will make use of concepts such as ‘humane treatment’ and 
‘unnecessary suffering’. I could, perhaps, make a point by always placing these words in 
quotation marks so as to underline their indeterminacy and the fact that, as we will see in 
chapter III, they do not, as legal concepts, correspond to what the same words mean in 
colloquial language. For the remainder of this work, no special formatting will be used in 
attempt to make these concepts stand out; for the time being, suffice it to say that Gary 
Francione is correct in noting that the concept of ‘humane treatment’, for example, is ‘just 
another concept whose meaning has been twisted out of recognition’ by the contemporarily 
prevalent theory of animal welfare53. 
 
                                                 
52 cf Stone (n 22) 294. 
53 See Gary L Francione, Animals, property, and the law (Temple University Press 1995) 30. 
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II ANIMALS AND ETHICS 
And God blessed Noah and his sons, and said unto them, Be fruitful, and 
multiply, and replenish the earth. And the fear of you and the dread of you shall 
be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that 
moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they 
delivered. Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green 
herb have I given you all things.54 
The exploitation of animals, no matter how strongly it pervades contemporary societies, gives 
rise to many moral considerations. How should we feel about the fact that male chicks of the 
egg-laying strain are treated as a form of industrial waste and disposed of accordingly55? Is it 
right or wrong to hold Asian black bears in so-called crush cages and carve permanent fistulae 
in their abdomen to extract their bile56? No easy answers present themselves here; concerns 
surrounding animal exploitation connect to some of the most fundamental questions of 
morality, which, in part, explains the considerable breadth of literature on animal ethics and 
                                                 
54 Genesis 9:1–3 (KJV). 
55 See RSPCA, ‘What happens with male chicks in the egg industry?’ (RSPCA Australia knowledgebase, 24 March 
2014) <http://kb.rspca.org.au/What-happens-with-male-chicks-in-the-egg-industry_100.html> accessed 11 July 
2014; AVMA, AVMA guidelines for the euthanasia of animals: 2013 edition (AVMA 2013) 62–3 
<https://www.avma.org/kb/policies/documents/euthanasia.pdf> accessed 11 July 2014. 
56 See generally IK Loeffler, J Robinson, and G Cochrane, ‘Compromised health and welfare of bears farmed for 
bile in China’ (2009) 18 Animal Welfare 225; Yibin Feng and others, ‘Bear bile: dilemma of traditional medicinal 
use and animal protection’ (2009) 5 Journal of Ethnobiology and Ethnomedicine 
<http://www.ethnobiomed.com/content/5/1/2> accessed 14 July 2014; Fiona MacGregor, ‘Inside a bear bile 
farm in Laos’ (The Telegraph, 19 August 2010) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/laos/7950161/Inside-a-bear-bile-farm-in-Laos.html> 
accessed 11 July 2014. 
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the fact that over the course of millennia, writers have taken radically different positions in 
regard to the status and treatment of animals. What follows here is the first step in developing 
a framework for understanding the moral implications of international animal law. By 
examining moral theories from one extreme to the other, we will see just how differently the 
relationship between humans and animals and the nature of human duties (or lack thereof) 
towards animals can be approached in terms of moral philosophy. 
As is often the case with understanding, animal ethics, too, becomes more comprehensible if 
we can conceive of some way to systematize theories, to arrange them in groups based on 
some common denominators. In moral philosophy, it is common to distinguish, for example, 
deontological theories from consequentialist theories: deontological theories assess the 
rightness and wrongness of conduct based on its adherence to moral duties or obligations 
whereas consequentialist theories determine rightness and wrongness solely on the basis of 
consequences57. This is a useful distinction in some contexts, but not here. The theories of 
Immanuel Kant and Tom Regan, for example, are both deontological, yet to label them as 
such and then move on as if that would have satisfactorily described their thought would be to 
grossly misrepresent what is a profound difference between their respective positions. 
My task in chapter IV is to examine the moral implications of international animal law, so this 
chapter should offer something of value for that purpose. As my analysis in chapter IV will 
serve to reiterate, there are two questions, I argue, all legal instruments pertaining to animals 
ultimately ask: 1) how do I perceive animals?; 2) how should animals be treated? All instruments, from 
fisheries agreements to multilateral conventions governing the conservation of endangered 
species to regional treaties prohibiting leg-hold traps, answer these questions either explicitly 
or implicitly. I cannot imagine a legal instrument that would be vague to a point where it could 
not give meaningful answers to these two questions. Any treaty, no matter how open for 
interpretation its language might be, will at the very least give some account of what an animal 
is—a natural resource, a representative of a species, an individual—and how it is to be treated—
must be conserved yet at the same time utilized to an optimal degree; commercial hunting 
prohibited, taking for scientific purposes permitted; particular slaughtering methods 
proscribed, otherwise free to be exploited; and so on. These observations in mind, I have 
                                                 
57 See James Fieser, ‘Ethics’ (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) <http://www.iep.utm.edu/ethics/> accessed 3 
August 2014. 
16 
sought to address each theory examined in this chapter by asking these same questions: what is 
the moral status of animals under this theory, how must we treat animals? 
So, how to systematize? First of all, extremes are helpful: by contrasting opposite positions 
with each other, both can be understood with greater clarity. The theories examined here will 
be placed in three groups, two of them being in stark contrast with each other with an 
intermediary position lying between the extremes. The purpose here is not to judge which 
theory one should abide by; it is simply to develop a framework for the later analysis of 
international animal law. In order to avoid the movement from one extreme to the other 
implying progression or regression, the final section of this chapter will close the circle, as it 
were, by presenting critique against theories from all three groups. 
The first group examined places animals in a position subordinate to humans and holds that 
the treatment of animals is not a morally relevant question. The two theories constituting this 
group will be those of Aristotle and René Descartes. The second group holds, similarly, that 
animals are inferior to humans and that it is prima facie morally permissible to use animals as 
means to human ends. However, the theories in this group posit that humans nonetheless 
have indirect duties to animals. The theories examined under this group belong to Thomas 
Aquinas and Immanuel Kant. The third and final group holds that there are no morally 
relevant differences between humans and animals and that humans owe duties to animals 
directly. The first theory is the ‘preference-utilitarianism’ of Peter Singer, the second the ‘rights 
view’ of Tom Regan.58 All of the theories examined under the three headings can meaningfully 
be approached through the two questions formulated above since they all present a view on 
the human-animal relationship as well as the manner in which animals ought to be treated. 
The following sections are not intended to be a comprehensive study of animal ethics: the 
entirety (assuming it is even possible to locate all literature on the topic) of contesting theories 
could not be assessed satisfactorily within present constraints, nor is it my intention to attempt 
such a feat. Instead, each section will showcase two theories that, I believe, best exemplify the 
                                                 
58 For our present purposes, I will borrow Regan’s distinction between ‘indirect duty views’ and ‘direct duty 
views’ without implying that the theories examined here are predicated on a concept of duty. I therefore use the 
term merely as a shorthand when assessing whether a particular theory holds animals to be morally relevant in 
and of themselves or for someone (or something) else’s sake. See Regan (n 28) 150–1. I owe the division of 
theories into three groups initially to Scott Wilson, however I disagree that we can consider the positions of 
Aristotle and Descartes as postulating indirect duties. I therefore place the two aforementioned into the first 
group explained above. See Scott D Wilson, ‘Animals and ethics’ (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) 
<http://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/> accessed 17 August 2014. 
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characteristics of the group under consideration. As will be seen below, the end result may 
very well be the same, but the approaches employed by the chosen theories vary greatly. 
As a final note, the focus here is predominantly Western: the ancient philosophy is Greek, the 
theology Christian, all the theories examined authored by white, (mostly) dead men. None of 
this is to say that there would be no literature on non-Western, non-Christian, perhaps even 
feminist animal ethics—quite the contrary. Yet this Western bias has, I fear, been unavoidable 
to a large extent. When Andrew Rowan states that ‘philosophers have written more on the 
general topic of animal rights during the past ten years than their predecessors wrote during 
the preceding two thousand’59, it is Western philosophers and their European predecessors he 
has in mind. The most influential figures spearheading the so-called ‘animal liberation 
movement’—Peter Singer and Tom Regan, for example—are Western authors (an Australian 
and an American, respectively). They, in turn, have been inspired by their European 
forefathers.60 The considerable breadth of Western philosophy on the point is reflected in the 
abundance of sources available for the researcher; relatively few works, by comparison, 
explore alternative approaches61. Edited volumes on animal ethics betray a similarly Western 
bias62. 
Ultimately my perpetuation of the cycle happens for two reasons. Firstly, the theories of 
animal welfare and animal rights examined in chapter III are the direct product of moral 
theories developed in Western thought. Consequently, I believed it best to focus on those 
theories that are most relevant in this regard. That said, secondly, while either similar or even 
altogether different theories could be found in non-Western, non-Christian literature, what 
more would a wider cultural or religious basis have offered here? As we shall see shortly, 
indirect duty views, for example, can be understood by reference to the works of Thomas 
Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, and John Rawls, just to name three authors. Would it have made a 
considerable difference had I included a, say, buddhist perspective? I do not think so. 
  
                                                 
59 Tom Regan and Peter Singer (eds), Animal rights and human obligations (2nd edn, Prentice-Hall 1989) vii. 
60 Singer, being a consistent utilitarian, is naturally indebted to Jeremy Bentham and other classical utilitarian 
philosophers. Regan, when fleshing out his concept of moral rights, borrows directly from another utilitarian, 
John Stuart Mill. See Regan (n 28) 269–71. 
61 See generally eg Kemmerer (n 48) 283–359; Oja (n 29) 42–4. 
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A just war 
Suppose no duties exist between humans and animals: animals are not morally relevant, their 
treatment raises no issues that morals should be concerned with. It is helpful, though not 
necessary, to conceive of some characteristic that distinguishes us from them for this position 
to work. The philosophy of Aristotle and René Descartes illustrate this point well: one finds 
the justification for animal exploitation in the natural order of things, the other in their lack of 
consciousness. 
Humans are animals, too, says Aristotle, but the human being is a political animal, more so than 
any other species. Animals may possess a voice, allowing them to express what they perceive as 
painful or pleasant; man, however, is the only animal who nature gifted with reasoned speech. 
Speech permits one to express what is advantageous and harmful, what is just and unjust, and 
it is a ‘peculiarity of humans’ to have a perception of good and bad, of just and unjust.63 
Animals, it follows, may share in on an understanding of pain and pleasure, but they cannot 
understand concepts such as ‘right’, ‘wrong’, or ‘justice’. 
Aristotle, as is well known, was a supporter of slavery. For him, it was nature’s design that 
those who ‘[share] reason sufficiently to perceive it’ but do not have it for themselves be 
enslaved and ruled over by masters who do possess reason. Tame animals, too, were better off 
being ruled by human masters for their own preservation. ‘It is manifest’, Aristotle says, ‘that 
by nature some are free and others slaves and that service as a slave is for the latter both 
beneficial and just.’64 But just as nature had made some men slaves and other men masters, so 
too did it make some things exist for the sake of others. To live without food is impossible, 
Aristotle remarks, but fortunately nature has catered for all diets, both human and animal. It is 
to be supposed, then, that nature made plants for the sake of animals and animals, in turn, for 
the sake of humans, for our use, food, clothing, tools, and so on.65 And thus the use of 
animals as commodities was justified: 
If nature, therefore, makes nothing either incomplete or in vain, then she has 
necessarily made all these things for the sake of human being, and hence the art of 
war will also by nature be a science of property in a way. For the art of hunting is 
a part of it, and this art has to be used against wild animals and those human 
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beings who, though unwilling to be ruled, are naturally fit for it, as this war is by 
nature just.66 
Few today, of course, would share Aristotle’s belief about slavery being a natural condition for 
humans and animals alike—certainly not for humans, at any rate. Descartes provides us with 
an alternative that does allow us to set all humans apart from all animals. The underlying idea is 
very simple: humans are conscious, animals are not. 
For Descartes, use of language evidences thoughts and, thus, consciousness. We could not, he 
claims, distinguish between an irrational animal and a machine carefully built to imitate one, 
but we would always be able to see the difference between real human beings and machines 
built to resemble humans. For even if these machines could emit words and cry out when we 
hurt them, they could not arrange words into sentences and spontaneously express their 
thoughts, and even if they would exceed our skill in some particular task, they would fail in 
others, by which we would know that they act not out of consciousness and reason, but out of 
the mere disposition of their organs.67 
The same test can be used to distinguish humans from animals. Even the ‘dull-witted’, the 
‘stupid’, and ‘madmen’ can express their thoughts by using language; no animal can do the 
same. Further, attributing mental powers to animals on the fact that they, too, evidence more 
skill in some tasks than we do would mean that they are more intelligent than us and ‘surpass 
us in everything’; this is clearly not the case, because, just like machines, they only excel in 
some tasks whilst failing in others. Animals, then, have no reason, no mental powers: it is 
merely nature that acts in them, like the ropes and springs of a clock.68 
Where there is no consciousness, everything is permitted. Thus, if the body of a dog has no 
feeling, and its cries are merely the noise of some little spring being touched, there is nothing 
questionable in administering a beating, even nailing it on a wooden board and cutting it open. 
As for killing animals for food, Descartes’ view is ‘not so much cruel to animals as indulgent 
to men ... since it absolves them from the suspicion of crime when they eat or kill animals.’69 
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Humans and animals, then, are different in a morally relevant way. For Aristotle, nature made 
them for our sake, much as she made some men slaves and others masters. To use animals as 
nature intended, to hunt them as one would hunt men refusing to succumb to slavery, is to 
wage a just war. For Descartes, animals are void of feeling, consciousness, thoughts, reason. If 
something is more akin to a lifeless machine than to us, vivisecting it does not even begin to 
raise moral concerns. Morality is concerned with something else: how one is to lead a good 
life, relishing the virtues of means while steering clear of the vices of excesses and 
deficiencies70, or finding happiness in right judgments and knowledge71. Neither Aristotle nor 
Descartes state explicitly whether some guarantees or safeguards should nonetheless exist: it is 
their silence, in this regard, that speaks the loudest. Animals, it follows, are excluded from 
moral consideration: their deaths and their suffering (insofar as they are even capable of 
experiencing it) are no concern of ours. 
Duties to mankind 
To view that we have no duties whatsoever in regard to animals gives rise to some troubling 
questions. A Cartesian understanding of animal consciousness, as we have seen, permits not 
only the consumption of animal flesh but also violence in general, regardless of whether 
carried out for scientific purposes or for no reason at all, that is, gratuitously. The latter we 
might today term ‘cruelty’, a word fitting for the disapproval it conveys. What is one to do if 
the views of Aristotle and Descartes conform poorly with one’s own enlightened intuitions 
and sensibilities? 
This second position assumes that we have indirect duties to animals: that is, not duties to 
them, but duties involving them. Thus, animals are a ‘medium through which we ... either 
succeed or fail to discharge’  duties to nonanimals: ourselves, humanity, perhaps even God.72 
This is a position we do not find in Aristotle’s theory. For him, where there is no justice, there 
is no friendship either, not between master and slave, nor between man and horse73. 
To hold that humans have indirect duties to animals is not to hold that there are no 
differences between the former and the latter, nor is it to condemn using animals for food and 
other purposes. We may even continue to hold on to the idea of rationality as the 
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distinguishing characteristic and the Aristotelian idea that some beings are made for the sake 
of others. Thomas Aquinas certainly did so, although he does name several other differences 
apart from rationality. In Summa contra gentiles, Aquinas gives a relatively comprehensive listing 
of what sets ‘intellectual creatures’ apart from the rest74, but his writings in Summa theologiae 
betray a much more Aristotelian influence: 
... just as in the generation of things we perceive a certain order of procession of 
the perfect from the imperfect ... so also is there order in the use of natural things; 
thus the imperfect are for the use of the perfect; as the plants make use of the 
earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and man makes use 
of both plants and animals.75 
‘There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for which it is’, Aquinas writes, and from 
there flows the lawfulness of killing and using animals76. At this stage, we are at a position 
roughly comparable to that of Aristotle: animals exist for the sake of humans, there is nothing 
questionable or unjust in using them as commodities. Here, however, Aquinas takes a step 
away from the unbridled human dominance over lower creation. He is keenly aware that 
certain passages in scripture forbid us to be cruel to animals. How could this be? Three 
explanations follow. Firstly, cruelty may be prohibited to ‘remove man’s thoughts from being 
cruel to other men ... lest through being cruel to animals one become cruel to human beings’77. 
Secondly, injuring an animal may entail harm to a fellow human being, such as its owner. 
Finally, scripture itself may offer an explanation in some cases. Thus the prohibition against 
‘muzzling the ox that tradeth the corn’, for example, does not mean that God cares for oxen: 
‘[f]or our sakes, no doubt, this is written’.78 Cruelty against animals, then, is not wrong in 
itself79. But it may be wrong, on occasion, because of our concern for our fellow human 
beings. 
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Turning to more secular philosophy, Immanuel Kant, too, held rationality to be the 
requirement for entrance into the moral community. For Kant, having a representation of 
one’s ‘I’ means one is self-aware and consequently rational. Animals may ‘have representations 
of the world, but not of their I’, which means they are neither self-aware nor rational.80 The 
faculty of reason, then, is the morally relevant difference here, and its implications cannot be 
overemphasized. For it is only rational beings, persons, who exist as ends in themselves, as 
‘something that may not be used merely as means’. Beings without reason, things, have only 
relative value as means.81 So when the ‘supreme practical principle’ obliges us to ‘[a]ct so that 
you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the 
same time as end and never merely as means’82, nothing is said about our duties to animals—
precisely because there are no duties owed by persons to things. 
But Kant is not blind to the issues raised by cruelty either. Yet his formulation of the 
categorical imperative, as we have seen, precludes him from conceiving of duties owed directly 
to animals. What is Kant to do? He finds the solution in our duties to ourselves. Treating 
animals cruelly or otherwise without love is demeaning to ourselves. More than that, it 
‘contains an analogy of violation of the duty to ourselves’ since we would never treat ourselves 
cruelly. Cruelty, then, is ‘an indirect violation of humanity in our own person’.83 Kant seems to 
be particularly worried about the effects of animal cruelty on children and strikes a rather 
Thomist note when he observes that those who treat animals cruelly are likely to also be 
hardened towards their fellow men 84 . That will not do; we must cultivate our duties to 
humanity. Thus 
[i]f a dog ... has served his master long and faithfully, that is an analogue of merit; 
hence I must reward it, and once the dog can serve no longer, must look after him 
to the end, for I thereby cultivate my duty to humanity ... if a man has his dog 
shot, because it can no longer earn a living for him, he is by no means in breach 
of any duty to the dog, since the latter is incapable of judgment, but he thereby 
damages the kindly and humane qualities in himself, which he ought to exercise in 
virtue of his duties to mankind.85 
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In this group of theories, humans and animals continue to be different in morally relevant 
ways. Aquinas found the difference in many things, the order of nature one among them, 
Kant mostly in rationality. Still other differences could certainly be claimed. John Rawls, for 
example, believed that the possession of a ‘sense of justice’ is what separates those who are 
owed justice from those who are not. Even so, we could still hold that, as he puts it, 
‘[c]ertainly it is wrong to be cruel to animals.’86 There is arguably a sense of compassion in 
these theories that is altogether absent in the views of Aristotle and Descartes. If anything, 
Aquinas and Kant show us that were one to find a morally relevant difference between 
humans and animals, it is possible to hold that exploiting animals is not morally wrong while at 
the same time holding that cruelty is. 
The anti-humanist thesis 
Perhaps it is possible to do better still. Whereas Aquinas and Kant hold that we may be 
compassionate and kind towards animals out of love for ourselves or even all of humankind, 
not everyone would agree that animals are a mere ‘practising-ground for virtue’87. Those who 
own companion animals, for example, might find it difficult to believe that their care for their 
pets is ultimately only an exercise in cultivating humane attitudes towards fellow human beings 
through a nonhuman medium. This final group of theories rejects the belief that duties to 
animals are indirect and holds that belonging to the species Homo sapiens is not morally 
relevant in and of itself—the ‘anti-humanist thesis’88. If humans and animals are similar in 
relevant respects, we either owe it to them to consider their interests on an equal footing with 
our own interests, or must recognize their moral right to respectful treatment, that is, 
treatment that recognizes their inherent value. 
Jeremy Bentham was among the first philosophers to question the great divide that had 
traditionally set humans apart from the rest of the animal kingdom and also justified their 
different treatment. In an oft-quoted footnote that tends to find its way into most writings on 
animal ethics (this thesis included), Bentham observed that 
[t]he day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights 
which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. 
The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason 
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why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a 
tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, 
the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally 
insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that 
should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the 
faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more 
rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, 
or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? 
the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?89 
Bentham and the utilitarians have received much praise for their then-radical inclusion of 
animals within the community of holders of relevant interests. The contemporarily prevalent 
legal theory of animal welfare—discussed in detail in chapter III—is arguably the direct 
descendant of utilitarianism.90 One contemporarily influential philosopher whose views are 
rather obviously indebted to Bentham’s theory is Peter Singer, author of Animal liberation. It is, 
perhaps, no surprise that the ‘animal liberation movement’ carries the name of Singer’s 
seminal book on animal equality. 
Equality, for Singer, is not restricted by boundaries of species membership. The opposite view 
he would label ‘speciesism’. Speciesism, akin to other forms of prejudice such as racism or 
male chauvinism, is a ‘prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of 
one’s own species and against those of members of other species.’91 If a being—any being—is 
capable of suffering, there can be no justification for turning a blind eye to that being’s 
suffering regardless of what species that being happens to be. Since suffering is the trigger for 
duties, sentience—the capacity to experience suffering and enjoyment—is the only defensible 
criterion for equal consideration.92 Singer is convinced animals can feel pain. Their nervous 
systems are virtually identical with ours, so it would be unparsimonious to assume that like 
behavior stems from some altogether different cause.93 
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So, how are animals to be treated under Singer’s theory? Simple: taking animal suffering into 
account on an equal basis is in itself the content of our (direct) moral duty. ‘[T]he principle of 
equality requires that [a sentient being’s] suffering be counted equally with the like suffering ... 
of any other being.’ 94  Singer’s position is a ‘form of utilitarianism’ 95 . Whereas classical 
utilitarianism (a consequentialist theory96) emphasizes pleasure and pain as the only relevant 
consequences to take into account, for Singer, the morally right course of action is that which 
best furthers the interests of everyone affected.97 
As a practical matter, Singer advises his readers to adopt vegetarianism98, but anyone familiar 
with the general characteristics of utilitarianism will soon realize that a utilitarian theory on the 
treatment of animals can hardly hope to lay down any absolute prohibitions: after all, it is the 
consequences that ultimately decide what is right or wrong in a particular scenario. Singer 
cannot oppose any particular form of animal exploitation in absolute terms because chances 
are consequential considerations will justify, in theory, even factory farming. These—and 
other—shortcomings of utilitarianism have lead Tom Regan to search for interspecial justice 
in deontological ethics. Singer rejects the language of rights as finding no place in his 
theory99—Regan, on the other hand, argues precisely for animal rights. 
Like Singer, Regan, too, believes that there are no morally relevant differences between 
humans and animals. At this stage, it is important to notice that Regan’s case for animal rights 
concerns first and foremost mammalian animals over one year old100. Such animals have a 
welfare: they ‘fare well or ill during the course of their life, and the life of [some of them] is 
experientially better than the life of others’101. Since they have a welfare, they can be harmed. 
Not all harms hurt, however: some take the form of deprivations. Death, even a painless one, 
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is the ultimate deprivation: it is irreversible because ‘once dead, always dead’, and it is 
fundamental because it ‘forecloses all possibilities of finding satisfaction’.102 
Rejecting indirect duty theories as morally arbitrary, Regan formulates the ‘harm principle’: ‘we 
have a direct prima facie duty not to harm individuals’, animals included103. He then postulates 
that some individuals have inherent value, that is, a value they have in and of themselves, which 
is ‘distinct from, not reducible to, and incommensurate with’ the intrinsic value of the 
experiences, pleasures, and preference satisfaction that may attach to them. The criterion for 
possessing inherent value is that a being is a subject-of-a-life. To be considered subjects-of-a-life, 
beings must have 
beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their 
own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; 
preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their 
desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in 
the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically 
independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being 
the object of anyone else’s interests.104 
All individuals who have inherent value have it equally and are due treatment that respects 
their inherent value—we cannot treat them ‘as if they lacked inherent value’, ‘as if they were 
mere receptacles of valuable experiences’, or ‘as if their value depended on their utility [to 
others]’. Endorsing John Stuart Mill’s conception of moral rights, Regan concludes that all 
subjects-of-a-life, whether human or animal, have a moral right to respectful treatment. 105 
What follows, by comparison to Singer’s theory, is an uncompromising stance: for the rights 
view, vegetarianism is a moral obligation, and nothing short of the ‘total dissolution of 
commercial animal agriculture as we know it’ will do. There is no room for consequential 
considerations in Regan’s deontological ethics: ‘[t]he totem of utilitarian theory (summing the 
consequences for all those affected by the outcome) is the taboo of the rights view.’106 
And so we have arrived from one extreme to the other. In this group, which represents both 
the consequentialist and deontological currents of moral philosophy, there are no morally 
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relevant differences between humans and animals. Whether it be because of their sentience of 
their being ‘subjects-of-a-life’, the moral status of (some) animals is equal to that of humans. 
For Singer, this means that their interests must be given equal consideration which, prima 
facie, proscribes the consumption of animal flesh. For Regan, the recognition of animal rights 
calls for the abolition of all institutionalized exploitation of animals. 
Nonsense upon stilts 
One of the mission statements of this chapter was that we shall not pass judgment on the 
theories examined, that is, argue that some theories are ‘good’ according to some assumed 
standards whereas some others are ‘bad’. To abstain from endorsing a particular theory at the 
expense of all others does not, however, mean that one could not be critical about animal 
ethics. As I have already hinted at some of the issues utilitarian theories run into when trying 
to formulate a sound theory for the treatment of animals, it is only fair we express here some 
critique against all of the theories showcased in the above sections. Then end result, I believe, 
is that regardless of their presumptions and conclusions, for our present purposes the 
showcased views have merely represented different ways of conceiving of the relationship 
between humans and animals and the nature of duties existing between the two; they have not 
represented good or bad moral viewpoints. Since the purpose of this chapter is to contribute 
towards the development of a framework that permits an analysis of international animal law, 
the exposition of theories here has been, if anything, illustrative. 
The theories of Aristotle, Descartes, and Aquinas have been criticized enough in literature on 
animal ethics, so I will be brief. Suffice it to say that evolutionary theory casts serious doubt 
on any idea of animals existing solely for the sake of humans107, and that those of us who do 
not believe in God or any other deities will not accept appeals to spiritual authorities at any 
rate. As for Descartes, most today would simply consider his claim empirically inaccurate: 
there is good reason to believe that animals do feel pain when nailed on a board108. 
Kant is in many ways just as arbitrary as Descartes—for different reasons, of course. The so-
called argument from marginal cases 109  illustrates this point well. Since Kant holds that 
rationality is what places humans into the class of persons and animals into the class of things, 
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he basically claims that all humans are rational whereas no animals are. However, no matter 
how we interpret the concept of rationality, it is fairly clear that some human beings will not 
make the cut: infants, the senile, the severely disabled, and so on. To make things more 
complicated, not all marginal cases are alike: some of them have the potential to become 
rational (infants), some of them used to be rational but will never be again (the senile), and 
some (such as people born in a vegetative state) never were and never will be.110 It is simply 
impossible to construe rationality so as to include all human beings regardless of their mental 
state. Kant would therefore either need to concede that his division of beings into persons and 
things is completely arbitrary (and arguably speciesist) or lower the bar in hopes of finding 
some other faculty capable of encompassing all of humankind—which would probably lead 
him closer to the positions of Singer (sentience) or Regan (subject-of-a-life) than his initial 
one. 
Some concerns relating to utilitarian theory have already been aired in the above section. Most 
philosophers are concerned about the fact that utilitarianism, taken to its extreme, may 
condone just about any form of discrimination as long as it is justified by the consequences—
equality as a matter of principle may transform into gross inequality as a matter of fact. We 
may not be racists, but it can certainly be imagined that in a particular situation the best overall 
balance of interests is reached by giving preferential treatment to the strong at the expense of 
the weak.111 As Robert Nozick pointed out, 
‘[u]tilitarian theory is embarrassed by the possibility of utility monsters who get 
enormously greater gains in utility from any sacrifice of others than these others 
lose. For, unacceptably, the theory seems to require that we all be sacrificed in the 
monster’s maw, in order to increase total utility.’112 
Even Regan’s theory, prima facie the most favorable to animals, is not beyond critique, 
particularly because of its reliance on the idea of moral rights. As Bentham, a famous 
opponent of moral rights, argued, there are only legal rights—‘no rights contrary to the law[,] 
no rights anterior to the law’. For him, moral rights were ‘simple nonsense ... rhetorical 
nonsense,—nonsense upon stilts.’113 Moreover, some scholars refuse to accept the idea of 
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animals’ rights as a matter of principle114. Ruth Cigman’s theory takes a different approach as it 
denies that the death of an animal can be considered a harm (or a ‘misfortune’) because in 
order to be harmed by death, one must have categorical desires, that is, desires that do ‘not 
merely presuppose being alive ... but rather [answer] the question whether one wants to remain 
alive.’ Animals cannot have categorical desires for the simple reason that they do not 
understand life and death as we do.115 Finally, let us remember that Regan’s rights view prima 
facie excludes all non-mammalian animals as well as mammals below one year of age116. In this 
sense, Regan could be critiqued not on grounds of going too far but on grounds of not going 
far enough. Perhaps the only feasible solution to this last concern is to revere all life and help 
everything living, as Albert Schweitzer would have us do117—a position not without problems of 
its own. 
To conclude this chapter, we have now seen that the moral status of animals can, depending 
on the theory, range from nonexistent to inferior to equal in all respects. At one extreme, all 
forms of animal exploitation were morally permissible—at the other, all institutionalized 
exploitation has to go. No position examined here is beyond critique, and none of them 
command universal support. These things said, we have now developed the first part of the 
framework that will be used in interpreting international animal law in chapter IV—we 
understand, in broad terms, the moral implications of the relationship between humans and 
animals and the manner in which animals ought to be treated. 
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III ANIMALS AND THE LAW 
Whereas it is expedient to prevent the cruel and improper Treatment of Horses, 
Mares, Geldings, Mules, Asses, Cows, Heifers, Steers, Oxen, Sheep, and other 
Cattle ... if any person or persons shall wantonly and cruelly beat, abuse, or ill-treat 
any Horse, Mare, Gelding, Mule, Ass, Ox, Cow, Heifer, Steer, Sheep, or other 
Cattle ... he, she, or they so convicted shall forfeit and pay any Sum not exceeding 
Five Pounds, not less than Ten Shillings, to His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors 
...118 
There is nothing particularly novel about human law sometimes involving animal objects. 
Animals were involved in murder trials in ancient Greece119 and tried before secular and 
ecclesiastical courts in medieval and early modern Europe120. From moles in Italy to a dog in 
Switzerland, EP Evans’ work on the topic suggests that at least 191 such trials occurred 
between 824 and 1906121. In modern times, animal trials of a kind still exist, but they take a 
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radically different appearance compared to the excommunication of rats or the burning of an 
egg-laying rooster on a stake. Rather, they are trials in which, for example, human owners of 
aggressive dogs are given the opportunity to be heard prior to a legal decision that will affect 
their property122. 
Perhaps it would be anachronistic to claim that modern animal law has its roots in the murder 
trials held at the Prytaneum of ancient Athens. After all, we have reason to believe that there 
was little legal about that practice, that it was mostly a ritualistic cleansing of the community 
following a death caused by an inanimate object or an animal123. It is difficult to see how such 
quasi-legal proceedings could reasonably be seen as some kind of a ‘precursor’ to our 
contemporary understanding of animal law, which typically takes the form of anticruelty and 
welfare laws. The legal paradigm of animals as things that can be owned one could perhaps 
trace back to biblical times—passages from the Bible and the views of Aristotle and Aquinas 
certainly betray corresponding attitudes—, and some scholars indeed believe that the so-called 
‘great chain of being’ (scala naturae) is much to blame for the continuing plight of animals124. Be 
that as it may, it is commonly held, as was noted in chapter II, that the contemporary theory 
of animal welfare, introduced in modern legal systems by way of anticruelty statutes in the 
19th century, owes much to utilitarian philosophy. However, as will be examined below, while 
the law does require that contesting interests be balanced against one another, the prevalent 
regime hardly gives these interests equal weight.  
The purpose of this chapter is to finish what was started in chapter II: to develop a framework 
for the analysis of international animal law. While we have now attained a satisfactory 
understanding of how moral theories assess the status and treatment of animals, the 
contesting (legal) theories of animal welfare and animal rights offer a unique perspective to 
how these moral positions translate into the language of law. In broad terms, the theory of 
animal welfare postulates that it is acceptable to use animals as things for the purpose of 
satisfying human needs provided certain ‘safeguards’ are in place: namely, animals must be 
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treated ‘humanely’ and ‘unnecessary’ suffering must not be inflicted. The theory of animal 
rights, consistent with the demands of Regan’s theory, rejects the idea that animals have only 
instrumental value and calls for the abolition of their property status and their institutionalized 
exploitation.125 In a nutshell, animal welfare is about regulating exploitation, animal rights about 
abolishing it126. From here, this chapter continues by examining both positions in turn, after 
which a final section will address certain issues left unanswered as well as a number of 
intermediary positions lying between the two extremes. 
‘Humane treatment’, ‘unnecessary suffering’ 
Prior to the 19th century or so, there was little the law either prescribed or proscribed in 
regard to the treatment of animals. It is fair to say that societies did not consider it legitimate 
or even necessary to regulate human-animal relations by law. Where law does not exist, the 
task of regulating conduct falls upon morality, and the moral beliefs shared by those living in 
early modern societies were a far cry from contemporary attitudes pertaining to animal use. 
‘Cruelty to animals pervaded eighteenth-century England’, writes Mike Radford; ‘the majority 
of the population simply disregarded their suffering, but a significant proportion positively 
revelled in it.’ Only as the 19th century drew near did attitudes begin to change.127 
One of the earliest legal instruments to afford protection to animals was the 1641 legal code 
of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, which provided that ‘[n]o man shall exercise any Tirranny 
or Crueltie towards any bruite Creature which are usuallie kept for man’s use.’128 However, the 
first anticruelty law in any modern sense of the word can be traced to 19th-century Britain. In 
1821, Richard Martin, Irish member of parliament for Galway, proposed a bill to prevent the 
ill treatment of horses. While succeeding in the House of Commons, the bill was rejected by 
the House of Lords and consequently failed to become law. Martin reintroduced a slightly 
modified bill a year later, this time managing to secure the necessary support from both 
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houses. The act, commonly referred to as Martin’s Act129, received royal assent on 22 June 
1822 and set the foundations for later British animal legislation.130 
Since then, animal law has flourished. By 2012, at least 65 states had enacted legal instruments 
to protect the welfare of animals131. Yet despite this proliferation, the language of animal law, 
for the most part, remains as vague as it was in 1641. The Massachusetts Body of Liberties 
spoke of ‘Tirranny’ and ‘Crueltie’, Martin’s Act of ‘cruel and improper treatment’. Turning to 
more contemporary sources, the British Protection of Animals Act of 1911 (a descendant of 
Martin’s Act) makes similar use of the word ‘cruel’ while adding the concept of ‘unnecessary 
suffering’132. Under Florida law, 
[a] person who unnecessarily overloads, overdrives, torments, deprives of necessary 
sustenance or shelter, or unnecessarily mutilates, or kills any animal, or causes the 
same to be done, or carries in or upon any vehicle, or otherwise, any animal in a 
cruel or inhumane manner, commits animal cruelty, a misdemeanor of the first 
degree ...133 
The Criminal Code of Finland, as a final example, provides that 
[a] person who intentionally or through gross negligence, by violence, excessive 
burdening, failure to provide the necessary food or otherwise ... treats an animal 
cruelly or inflicts unnecessary suffering, pain or anguish on an animal, shall be 
sentenced for an animal welfare offence to a fine or to imprisonment for at most 
two years.134 
None of these instruments offer the kind of concrete guidance that would allow a person to 
know with absolute certainty in each and every situation the limits of acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior. Prima facie, the ambiguity of terms such as ‘cruel’, ‘humane’, and 
‘unnecessary’ seems to suggest that the law leaves a considerable margin of appreciation to 
judges and other practitioners. The determination of what constitutes ‘necessary’ in any 
particular situation involves the balancing of contesting human and animal interests against 
one another, this much is true 135 . However, the nature of this balancing act becomes 
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fundamentally different once we take into account the fact that, as regards their legal status, 
modern (Western) legal systems characterize animals as property136. 
In Anarchy, state, and utopia, Robert Nozick describes an idea according to which the treatment 
of human beings is governed by Kantian deontological ethics while the treatment of animals 
depends on utilitarian considerations. This position, ‘utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for 
people’, essentially holds that human beings can never be sacrificed for the benefit of other 
humans (or animals) whereas animals may always be sacrificed for the benefit of humans or 
other animals as long as the benefits outweigh the losses.137 This idea of double standards has 
been commended for capturing well the most fundamental characteristics of the theory of 
animal welfare. Animals do matter morally, they just matter less than humans. It is completely 
acceptable to determine their fate by weighing the consequences flowing from alternate 
courses of action.138 Humans, on the other hand, cannot be sacrificed on the altar of utility; 
humans have legal rights, after all. While rights are rarely absolute in the sense that no 
transgression could ever be accepted139, they do, in many respects, delineate certain core areas 
of protection while also functioning as a last line of defense against attempts that would 
transgress these boundaries, thus compromising our human dignity or whatever other values 
we might hold dear. Put differently, there is nothing we cannot take from animals if the 
common good justifies doing so140 , but every human being deserves some basic level of 
protection regardless of considerations of general utility and even if there would be significant 
benefits to others. 
These double standards are accentuated as we remember that the legal rights of humans 
include the right to property. Animals are that property we have a right to. Therefore, the 
reconcilement of human and animal interests is something akin to trying to balance the 
interests of furniture against the interests of its owner. ‘The winner of the dispute’, as Gary 
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Francione would say, ‘is predetermined by the way in which the conflict is conceptualized in 
the first place.’141 It follows that the language of animal welfare theory—what constitutes 
‘cruelty’, ‘humane treatment’, or ‘unnecessary suffering’—cannot be divorced from the fact 
that the law places animals in a position subordinate to humans, and it follows further that the 
interests of animals are, consequently, subordinate to the interests of their human owners. The 
meaning of these concepts, as was noted at the end of chapter I, has been twisted out of 
recognition142: they do not correspond to what the same words would mean in colloquial 
parlance. Since the determination of what is ‘unnecessary’ or ‘necessary’ suffering occurs 
against the backdrop of a system where property owners are prima facie free to do whatever 
they want with their property, almost any benefit, no matter how inconsequential, can be 
considered as necessitating the suffering of an animal. Any balancing act, then, is rigged: the 
animal was set out to lose before the balancing even began.143 
To conclude, the theory of animal welfare is predicated on the fact that legal systems place 
humans in the rank of persons and animals in the rank of things. Much like in Kant’s ethics, 
persons are ends in themselves and cannot be sacrificed for the common good whereas things 
are mere means and can be disposed of accordingly. Animal welfare theory holds that it is 
morally permissible to treat animals as means to human ends as long as animals are treated 
‘humanely’ and not subjected to ‘unnecessary’ suffering. However, since these safeguards must 
be understood in the context of humans possessing legal rights to property and animals being 
the property, the law’s bias towards human property owners renders most of the key concepts 
of animal welfare language, as Michael Allen Fox would say, ‘empty of meaning’.144 
The right not to be treated as property 
The previous section has, admittedly, painted a rather bleak picture of animal welfare theory. 
Surely the welfarist approach has done something right during its (roughly) two-century-long 
reign? For one, some protection should obviously be preferred to no protection at all. As was 
noted by Mike Radford 145 , 18th-century Englishmen certainly did not harbor attitudes 
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favorable to nonhuman life. Whatever one may think of utilitarian theory, at the very least it 
has been responsible for cultivating more compassionate attitudes towards animals which, in 
turn, has enabled social reform and the development of modern animal law. ‘Much to their 
lasting credit’, writes Tom Regan, ‘the classical utilitarians championed the cause of animal 
welfare, something for which all who work for the improved treatment of animals are 
indebted.’146 Modern animal rights theory would hardly exist were it not for utilitarianism and 
animal welfare theory147. 
Welfarism, too, has its defenders. Robert Garner, in an aptly-named journal article, gives a 
more favorable account of animal welfare theory as he describes it as a ‘compromise between 
regarding animals as having no direct moral standing’, on the one hand, ‘and treating [them] as 
morally equivalent to humans’, on the other148. Depicting the indeterminacy of the language of 
anticruelty and welfare laws as a strength rather than weakness, he argues that the flexibility of 
the concept of ‘unnecessary suffering’ embodies considerable potential for incremental 
reform. ‘Thirty years ago or so’, he writes, ‘the wearing of fur and the testing of cosmetics on 
animals was regarded as acceptable. Now, many people in the Western world frown upon 
both practices.’149 It is true that in the right hands, the language of existing animal law may 
permit certain forms of exploitation being slowly moved from the category of permitted to 
that of proscribed. Moreover, the fact that there is some existing political consensus on the 
impermissibility of subjecting animals to gratuitous pain and suffering may facilitate the 
adoption of stricter measures of protection in the future—at least in theory. 
That said, the fact that welfarism no doubt has some redeeming qualities does not change the 
fact that it leaves much to be desired. Those adopting a rights view cannot help but find the 
tenets of animal welfare irreconcilable with their own moral beliefs. Insofar as the (lowly) 
status of animals in the consequentialism of welfare theory is concerned, it is fair to say that 
we are all those utility monsters Nozick warned us about150. Beyond critique on grounds of 
morality, anticruelty statutes, for example, often fail to extend protection to those animals 
most vulnerable to poor welfare as they exclude, inter alia, agricultural practices from their 
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scope151. Moreover, the notorious ambiguity of welfarist concepts is not helped by the fact 
that, as a British court duly noted, even extreme pain is manifestly not by itself sufficient to 
place suffering outside the realm of necessity152. Ultimately, a concern shared by many is that 
as long as animal welfare theory fails to reject the property status of animals, no meaningful 
protection for animals can exist153. 
As was said at the beginning of this chapter, the theory of animal rights seeks, as a matter of 
law and in broad terms, not to regulate but to abolish animal exploitation. This is admittedly a 
tall order: seeing as how animal exploitation pervades modern societies from the production 
of food and clothing to the supply of products designed for companion animals and the use of 
animal products in musical instruments, it is beyond doubt that ‘[t]here are powerful 
economic, legal, political, and social forces that militate against treating property as anything 
other than property.’154  Against such a backdrop it would be utopian to believe that the 
primary route to abolition should be in advocating legal reform amounting to a blanket ban on 
some or all forms of exploitation: in the absence of a sudden and unprecedented global shift 
in moral sensibilities, there is simply no way such aims would attract political support. Not 
surprisingly, many abolitionists seek their ultimate goal outside the realm of law. A common 
strategy is adopting and educating others about a vegan diet155. The idea is that in the long run, 
increased prevalence of veganism leads to the abolition of animal exploitation.156 
Whether abolitionists have been successful in converting people to veganism will be examined 
in the next section. As a general matter, however, it is fair to say that the view that animals 
have moral rights has thus far failed to translate into legal rights for any animal species. No state 
has recognized animals as possessing legal rights157, even though at times there have been 
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reforms that have gone well beyond what animal welfare theory would dictate. Since welfarism 
is so deeply committed to the belief that animals are rightless things, it is interesting to note 
that both the civil codes of Germany and Austria state expressly to the contrary: animals are 
not considered things. Yet it does not follow that the rejection of the thinghood of animals 
(which seems to be more of a semantic point at any rate) would entail legal rights. The 
relevant provisions simply state that animals are not things, legally speaking, and that they are 
protected by special laws: ‘Tiere sind keine Sachen; sie werden durch besondere Gesetze geschützt.’158 
As of 1999, New Zealand legislation has made it increasingly difficult to justify (legally) the use 
of nonhuman hominids in scientific research. Pursuant to the Animal Welfare Act, nonhuman 
hominids may not be used in ‘research, testing, or teaching’ without prior approval from a 
governmental authority 159 . The governmental authority, however, may not give approval 
unless she is satisfied that the use of a nonhuman hominid is in the best interest of the 
hominid itself or, alternatively, that the use is in the best interest of its species and that any 
harm to the hominid is outweighed by the benefits of its use 160. This is arguably a strict 
prohibition that is prima facie difficult to circumvent161. Moreover, it is clearly at odds with 
welfarist theory in that human interests are rendered inconsequential: unless the criteria of 
section 85(5) are met, no human interest can justify testing. However, it is well-established that 
while animal rights lobbyists did everything in their power to contribute to the drafting of the 
act, nothing about it is conducive to recognizing nonhuman hominids (or any other animals) 
as possessing legal rights162. Nor does the fact that the Indian Ministry of Environment and 
Forests declined to allow the establishment of a dolphinarium in India (and recommended 
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that all like proposals be rejected in the future)163 entail cetacean rights in the Indian legal 
system. 
Animal rights theory has been around for decades, but thus far it has failed to translate moral 
rights into legal ones. Since the abolition of animal exploitation though legal reform is not a 
politically feasible strategy164, it is not surprising that the most uncompromising animal rights 
activists have turned to veganism, thereby seeking to influence reform outside of law. 
Ultimately, abolitionism holds that animals only require one single right: ‘the right not to be treated 
as the property of humans’. However, according to Gary Francione, such a right will not be 
achieved until the institutionalized exploitation of animals has been abolished, bringing 
domesticated animals into existence is ceased, and non-domesticated animals and their 
habitats are left alone.165 
Making subjects out of objects 
All things considered, has either theory managed to alleviate the plight of animals? 
‘Abolitionists have worked for a few decades, and Welfarists for much longer, seeking to 
benefit animals. Yet the suffering and exploitation of animals continue unabated’, writes 
Elizabeth DeCoux 166 . Assuming the theory of animal welfare is every ounce as 
anthropocentric and exploitative as has been claimed above, it is difficult to see how one 
could reasonably consider its approach a success by any standards: while it does (ostensibly) 
afford many animals protection against human abuse, it also excludes many practices from 
regulation while its model of ‘utilitarianism for animals’, inasmuch as it appears to take 
animals’ interests into account fully and equitably, serves only to legitimize the subordinate 
status of animals as well as any form of exploitation that can be justified by appeal to general 
utility167. If there indeed is a ‘movement’ that aims at the ‘liberation’ of animals or at the very 
least to offer them some relief of pain and suffering, such a movement would not likely be 
satisfied with the underinclusive and vague character of welfarist regulation168. 
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On the other hand, neither has the rights view attained its goal of abolishing the property 
status of animals and their institutionalized exploitation. As the above discussion evidences, 
no modern society views animals as something that cannot be owned by humans, and neither 
do animals enjoy true legal rights in any society. At the beginning of this chapter, I stated that 
the theory of animal rights offers a unique perspective to how a moral position attributing 
rights to animals translates to the language of law. The translation seems to be this: law cannot 
liberate animals, it cannot eradicate their status as property. Since the strategy of the position 
of animal rights proper seeks to abolish the property status of animals indirectly by converting 
the world to veganism, thereby removing the demand for animal products, its effectiveness 
must be assessed by asking whether it has, as an empirical matter, managed to promote 
veganism and resulted in any meaningful change of affairs. This does not seem to be the case; 
while there are vegans and entire organizations promoting veganism in contemporary societies, 
and business enterprises increasingly cater to consumers refusing to use animal products, the 
amount of individuals committed to veganism, if anything, seems to be on the decline.169 
Since the extreme positions of welfare and abolition seem to require that one either accepts 
the status quo as just and desirable, or commits to a view that is politically difficult to promote 
and ultimately leads to, for example, the disappearance of all domesticated animals 170 , 
intermediary positions have flourished. There is considerable variety between the two 
extremes, so only some positions will be examined here. Firstly, it has been the strategy of 
some activists in recent years to bring cases before courts on behalf of specific animals. 
Occurring in common law counties in particular, the aim of this practice is to challenge the 
property status of animals by seeking to inspire judges to question the axioms of personhood 
and traditional animal law, thereby creating precedents favorable to future emancipation.171 
Thus far, however, no benches have been ready or willing to recognize that animals could 
have standing or possess any kind of legal rights the law ought to protect172. As Steven Wise 
readily admits, there are, as the state of affairs is, significant physical, economic, political, 
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religious, historical, legal, and psychological obstacles to ending ‘nonhuman animal slavery’173. 
Moreover, involving animals in trials faces considerable difficulties pertaining to, inter alia, 
agency174. 
Secondly, some authors have sought to address the problems of traditional welfare theory by 
taking the idea of a ‘special’ kind of property a step further. David Favre, for example, 
proposes a new category of ‘living property’175. Under this new category, animals have the 
right, inter alia, ‘not to be harmed’, ‘to be cared for’, ‘to be properly owned’, and ‘to file tort 
claims’176. Susan Hankin, on the other hand, would establish a category of ‘companion animal 
property’, thereby ensuring that decisions on custody, for example, would be more sensitive to 
the interests of the animals involved177. This is a position much less dramatic than abolition 
since it is premised on the acceptance of the property status of animals instead of rejecting it 
out of hand. Consequently, it is also politically more feasible.  
Finally, some authors have taken a route more theoretical compared to the rather practical 
approach of challenging existing doctrines before courts by exploring the possibility of 
animals as subjects of law. The argument generally begins by observing that the division of 
beings into subjects and objects is arbitrary. Animals are generally disqualified because they 
cannot bear legal responsibilities in any meaningful way. This follows from the belief that 
human law is a normative system regulating the behavior of humans, not animals.178 Modern 
legal systems do, however, recognize certain fictional entities, such as corporations, as legal 
subjects. This is in spite of the fact that these so-called legal persons, as they only exist as 
aggregates of natural persons, cannot meaningfully bear or discharge any duties by themselves. 
Legal persons can only act through individual human agents. 179  Those advocating the 
possibility of animal subjectivity generally hold that subjectivity is a matter of convention, of 
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will. Animals can be subjects of law if only one wills it; it is a wholly different matter, of course, 
whether this would have any meaningful bearing on the way in which they are treated.180 
To my knowledge, Visa Kurki is currently writing a doctoral dissertation on animal subjectivity 
at the University of Cambridge, and Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo from the University of 
Helsinki also plans to approach the question of animals from the perspective of subjectivity. It 
remains to be seen what emerges from their work. Perhaps the end product of their or others’ 
work is an exception to current doctrine, a special type of subjectivity only available to 
nonhumans. It must be borne in mind, however, that a more profound inclusion of animals in 
the normative system of human law may seem prima facie favorable, but it can also give rise 
to concerns. It is one thing to owe legal duties to something over which we do not claim 
jurisdiction; it is another to owe duties to something on the basis of that something being a 
subject of law. The legal ‘subjectivation’ of a being is, as Victoria Ridler points out, premised 
on the idea that ‘certain beings (the human animal) may define law and its subjects such that 
other beings (the non-human animal) would be subject to its laws.’181 To be a subject of the law 
is simultaneously to be subject to it. As Étienne Balibar formulates the question,  
why is it that the very name which allows modern philosophy to think and 
designate the originary freedom of the human being—the name of ‘subject’—is 
precisely the name which historically meant suppression of freedom, or at least an 
intrinsic limitation of freedom, i.e. subjection?182 
If Antony Anghie has taught us anything, it is that when the strong choose to include the 
weak in a normative system designed by the strong and for the strong, it, while ostensibly 
beneficial, might not truly be in the latter’s interest. Chances are one form of oppression is 
simply traded for another.183 
In chapter II, we peered into moral philosophy in order to understand how differently 
philosophers have approached the moral status of animals and the rightness and wrongness of 
their treatment. In this chapter, we sought to supplement our perspective by exploring how 
animals and the acceptable boundaries of their treatment are characterized under the law. It 
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would seem that during the early modern period and the historical periods that preceded it, 
morality did not take any great interest in the status and treatment of animals, nor did the law. 
Entering the late modern period, attitudes towards animals became more compassionate and 
the development of modern animal law, which primarily means anticruelty and welfare laws in 
conjunction with the doctrine of animals being property, was greatly influenced by utilitarian 
philosophy. Nearly two hundred years later, the manner in which the law regulates the 
treatment of humans and animals continues to be ‘utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for 
people’, as explained by Robert Nozick. Animal rights theory, while having spawned a 
considerable body of academically interesting literature, has thus far failed to result in legal 
rights for animals or the abolition of the institutionalized exploitation of animals. The 
theoretical framework of this thesis now completed, it remains to be seen how international 
animal law connects to these findings. 
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IV INTERNATIONAL ANIMAL LAW 
Modern Western legal systems are feeling the need to alter their conceptual 
framework so as to accommodate animal rights. Organisations such as Europe for 
Animal Rights have been pressing for the creation of an appropriate international 
framework to enforce animal welfare standards. Within domestic jurisdictions 
animal welfare has been the subject of detailed Acts and regulations, and 
questions of animal welfare have even been the subject of constitutional court 
decisions in Germany ... laying down basic guidelines about how legislatures 
should draw up ordinances regarding animal welfare law ... International law 
needs also to work towards developing principles, procedures and institutions 
which can move away from the treatment of non-human life as rightless objects 
and towards investing it with essential safeguards and affirmative protection.184 
Suppose international law is a complete system. Assuming the validity of this postulate, 
international law should apply to any international matter.185 Whether the treatment of animals 
is an ‘international matter’ is, of course, open to debate. On the one hand, there is good 
reason to believe that the exploitation of resources held in common is something states may 
want international law to regulate—and in fact it already does. In the absence of rules specific 
to some particular form of resource use or management, most imaginable situations should be 
capable of being solved by reference to two residual rules which are fundamental to the 
international legal order: territorial sovereignty and the freedom of the high seas. As we shall 
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see below, states’ use of their natural wealth and resources within the confines of their land 
territory and the territorial sea is, lacking any rule to the contrary, simply a matter of 
permanent sovereignty over these resources. Outside this sphere of sovereign control, states’ 
use of natural resources not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of any state is—again, lacking 
any rules to the contrary, such as those peculiar to certain maritime zones—largely subject to 
the freedom of any state to exploit the natural resources of the high seas. These two rules, 
very general in character, set a standard which many treaty-based and customary obligations 
modify or restrict further. Still, as the Permanent Court’s decision in the Lotus case186 serves to 
underline, international law is, as Jan Klabbers puts it, ‘a permissive system; behaviour must be 
considered permitted unless and until it is prohibited.’187 It follows that states may exploit 
animals, as natural resources, to the extent that the legal order does not expressly state to the 
contrary. 
On the other hand, it is a wholly different question whether any human treatment of animals, 
as a more general issue, is something the international legal order should be interested in. As 
was stated already in chapter I, international law is, by and large, a system intended to govern 
the conduct of states. Sometimes the nature of the international legal order has been explained 
through a metaphor that the states who make up the international community are like boxes 
on a shelf. The legal order is interested in what happens between the boxes, not what goes on 
inside them.188 Why should this legal order reach past the skin, as it were, of states all the way 
into their population and even to individual human beings and regulate their treatment of 
animals? Put this way, is the treatment of animals in general an ‘international issue’? 
There is good reason to answer in the positive. As an empirical matter, there are treaties that 
attempt to protect the welfare of animals. The European convention for the protection of 
animals for slaughter 189 , for example, regulates (inter alia) the unloading and stunning of 
animals prior to slaughter190. But it is clear that states are not capable of wielding puntillas, 
hammers, or pole-axes. In line with what has been said above about legal persons and agency, 
it is not states but the people of which they consist who are the addressees of these rules. The 
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fact that what goes on inside abattoirs is hardly ‘international’ in any reasonable interpretation 
of the word has not stopped states from adopting instruments governing the micro-level 
treatment of animals, as the existence of the slaughtering convention goes to prove. Moreover, 
there exist some regimes that, due to their almost universal acceptance, make the management 
of the welfare of some animals in some contexts a universal issue. 
The theory of animal welfare, as Mike Radford would probably word it, ‘has succeeded in 
persuading domestic policy makers that it is both legitimate and necessary to regulate by law ... 
the way in which animals should be treated’191. But this interest in the treatment of animals is 
no longer limited to domestic jurisdictions. ‘Protecting animals from suffering and cruelty’, 
writes Amy Draeger, ‘is a universal issue that, like other universal issues, is a legitimate subject 
of international agreement.’192 International animal law, then, pertains both to the macro- and 
micro-levels of animal exploitation. It regulates the exploitation of animals by states as a very 
broad matter, but also, sometimes, the treatment of animals by individual human beings. 
Thus, the analysis carried out in this chapter seeks to encompass both extremes of the law. 
Before beginning with the analysis in concreto, two preliminary issues must be addressed briefly. 
The first pertains to the scope and the focus of the study, that is, the selection of materials; the 
second to the interpretation of the materials selected. These concerns will now be addressed, 
both in turn, after which the focus shifts to the substance (and ethics) of international animal 
law itself. 
Delimitation of scope 
Turning to the first issue, this is a study of public international law. The system of public 
international law gave, in the 1950’s, birth to the European Communities193. Yet even though 
the legal rules adopted under the auspices of the Communities, now known as the European 
Union (‘EU’), are clearly ‘international’ in the sense that they operate on a level above and 
beyond the confines of any single sovereign state, this body of community or EU law is clearly 
separate from public international law. Not only are the two separated in the academic 
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teaching of law, the Union itself is very aware of its distinct character, which was emphasized 
as early as 1963 when the European Court of Justice observed that ‘the Community 
constitutes a new legal order of international law’194. ‘By contrast with ordinary international treaties’, 
it continued a year later, 
the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the 
Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and 
which their courts are bound to apply. By creating a Community of unlimited 
duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity 
and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, 
real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers 
from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited their 
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law 
which binds both their nationals and themselves.195 
It cannot be disputed that the EU has taken significant steps towards improving the welfare 
and protection of animals. Its very founding instruments now concede that animals are 
sentient 196  while its legislative acts regulate, inter alia, the slaughter of animals 197 , the 
maintenance of laying hens198, and the use of animals in scientific research199. Still, while my 
method has been interdisciplinary in the sense that I have not only departed from 
international law to animal law but also to animal ethics, I shall not attempt to mix EU law 
and public international law here. The remainder of chapter IV focuses on international law 
proper, the history and significance of EU animal law being a story best told elsewhere. 
Continuing with the topic of scope and focus, it is obvious that present constraints could 
never allow for a comprehensive study of all of international animal law. In chapter I, I already 
lamented the fact that including all primary sources of international law—treaties, custom, and 
general principles—would have been too broad a scope for an Master’s thesis, and 
consequently excluded the two latter as objects of study in this work. A problem remaining is 
that the sheer amount of treaty-law pertaining to animals makes it impossible still to account 
for all of it. Besides, not all of these instruments are alike: some pertain only to a single species 
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of animals, some ostensibly cover all of them; some apply to trade in animal specimens, others 
to their hunting; some regulate the treatment of animals more directly while others protect 
them indirectly by regulating the management of their habitats; and so on. There is a need, 
then, to systematize and to delimit—but how to do it? 
Much like domestic legal systems, international law, too, fails to comprehensively include all 
animals within the scope of express regulation. David Favre has noted that existing treaties 
divide, whether explicitly or implicitly, animals into two categories: wildlife and domestic. 
While European states have been particularly active in developing instruments in regard to 
domesticated animals, no treaty or other instrument regulates the treatment of domesticated 
animals on a global basis.200 But the law not only distinguishes the wild from the domesticated, 
it also places significant emphasis on what a particular animal is used for. As Joan Schaffner 
has observed, each human use of animals raises different legal issues and thus requires a 
regime of its own to address these issues. Whereas the legal regulation of, say, companion 
animals may differ greatly from that of animals used for farming purposes, it is also possible 
that a single animal or a species of animals falls under several regimes depending on the 
situation. Dogs are often kept for companionship, but they may also be used for research. 
‘The law’, then, ‘treats the same animal differently depending upon the human’s use of the 
animal.’201 
As I see it, international animal law is not a unified, consistent body of law regulating human-
animal interaction. To the contrary, this field of international law is quite fragmented and 
covers a great expanse of human and state behavior involving animal objects. Recalling what 
was said in chapter II, it is relevant to ask how the law perceives animals. From the outset, it 
would seem that there are, in broad terms, three spheres of animal regulation present in the 
contemporary international legal system. Firstly, as was hinted above, some parts of the law 
deal with animals as resources. This sphere is premised on broad and far-reaching rules that 
organize how natural resources are to be exploited and conserved, though at times the rules 
governing conservation can also take a highly detailed and technical appearance. The key 
characteristic of this branch of the law is that animals are not seen as individuals but as parts 
of a greater concept of natural, living, or biological resources that may encompass several 
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species or hierarchically higher-ranking taxa of animals. This sphere, then, is about macro-level 
regulation. 
Secondly, there is an ever-growing body of the law that seeks to preserve and protect animals 
as members of a particular species or group thereof. Unlike the rules governing the exploitation 
of the natural resources of the seas and oceans, for example, which rarely take an interest in 
what individual animals swim around in a particular maritime zone, instruments in this branch 
of the law identify some animals by reference to their species as deserving special protection. 
Some instruments, for example, name several species and place trade in these species under 
strict conditions. Others may identify a particular geographical area or certain identifiable 
habitats wherever they might occur as subject to conservation, whereby species deemed 
important (but also other animals) are protected insofar as they happen to dwell in these 
designated areas. 
Rules in this group do often, in practice, regulate the treatment of individual animals, such as 
in the attempted export of an individual specimen belonging to a protected species. But they 
do not do so because they would be somehow intimately interested in safeguarding the 
welfare of individual animals regardless of what species they belong to or what their 
conservation status is: quite the contrary, in this sphere, individual animals become objects of 
the law for the sole reason that they belong to a species that is considered worthy of special 
protection or otherwise more important that other species. The interaction of this branch with 
individual animals, then, is largely incidental.  If the first sphere was said to be about macro-
level protection, this sphere is a hybrid residing somewhere between the micro- and the 
macro-level perspectives. 
Thirdly and finally, there are instruments that, while they may refer to animals through their 
type of use, are essentially interested in how individual animals are treated. This group differs 
from the first one in that the discretion left to states (or individuals) in regard to treatment is 
much less limited. Fisheries agreements, for example, do not generally prescribe how 
individual fish ought to be handled in the process of exploitation. This group also differs from 
the second one in that its reason for protecting animals is not premised on these animals being 
threatened with extinction or otherwise in dire need of preservationist efforts. The second 
group’s occasional focus on individual animals is incidental; here, the entire point is to set 
standards for the treatment of individual animals. Natural resources or species are not gassed 
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in slaughterhouses: individual animals are. Consequently, this sphere is about micro-level 
regulation. 
This division of international animal law into three spheres does not change the fact that the 
breadth of treaty-law pertaining to animals is still impossible to be accounted for 
comprehensively in this thesis, but it does facilitate the selection of materials for closer 
scrutiny. The remainder of chapter IV will examine each of these three spheres in turn by 
focusing on a single instrument I believe best represents the core characteristics of that 
sphere. The first sphere is exemplified through the United Nations convention on the law of 
the sea 202  (‘UNCLOS’) as representing the global regulation of fishing. Drafted with the 
intention to comprehensively regulate the law of the sea, fisheries and marine scientific 
research included203, the UNCLOS, with 166 parties as I write this204, is clearly the largest and 
most significant instrument governing fishing under international law. The second sphere, that 
of international conservation law, will be addressed by reading the Convention on 
international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora205 (‘CITES’). The CITES, 
often praised for its effectiveness and significance, is the main international legal instrument 
regulating trade in endangered species206. With 180 parties207, it is one of the most universally-
accepted conservation treaties in existence. 
The third and final sphere is best represented by a treaty governing animal welfare. As is 
notorious among international animal lawyers, however, no universal legal instrument on 
animal welfare currently exists208. The examination of the third sphere therefore takes a more 
regional approach. It has been observed that the Council of Europe (‘CoE’) was the first 
supranational organization to legislate on animal welfare matters on the international plane209. 
Consequently, the treaties adopted under its auspices were the first international agreements to 
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lay down ‘ethical principles for the transport, farming and slaughter of animals as well as for 
their use as pets and for experimental purposes.’210 While, indeed, the CoE treaties govern a 
wide range of animal uses, the treaty best exemplifying the welfare aspects of European treaty-
law is the European convention for the protection of animals kept for farming purposes211. 
With 33 ratifications or accessions as I write this212, it is also among the most widely accepted 
of the CoE animal treaties. 
Interpreting ethically 
Turning to the second preliminary issue, how are these representative instruments to be 
interpreted? Thankfully, since the selected instruments are treaties, the international legal order 
itself provides considerable guidance for the task at hand. Moreover, chapters II and III of 
this thesis developed the vocabulary necessary for understanding the moral implications of the 
law. Understanding the ethics of international animal law lies in the combination of these two 
elements, the general rules governing the interpretation of treaties taken together with the 
theoretical framework developed earlier in this thesis. 
Treaties, as is well-established, are international agreements ‘concluded between States in 
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or 
in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation’213. The Vienna 
convention on the law of treaties (‘VCLT’) entered into force in 1980, and has since come to 
comprehensively regulate most if not all matters pertaining to treaties. Now, two out of the 
three treaties examined more closely here—the CITES and the European convention for the 
protection of animals kept for farming purposes—were concluded before (1975 and 1978 
respectively) the entry into force of the VCLT. Pursuant to article 4 of the convention, it 
applies only to treaties which are concluded by states after the entry into force of the VCLT 
with regard to the states in question. However, this does not preclude the application of such 
rules of the convention that exist simultaneously elsewhere in international law, such as rules 
of custom. 
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The VCLT also regulates the interpretation of treaties and, in this regard, is seen as codifying 
existing customary law on the point. Indeed, as the case of Kasikili/Sedudu island evidences, the 
ICJ saw no reason not to apply the rules of the convention to a bilateral treaty between Great 
Britain and Germany that had been concluded in 1890, some 90 years prior to the entry into 
force of the VCLT.214 Therefore, it is only fitting that we take the provisions of the VCLT as a 
starting point in our endeavor to understand international animal law. 
The general rule of interpretation states that ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose.’ 215  This provision combines three schools of 
interpretation: the textual, the contextual, and the teleological216. Whilst the three are prima 
facie in equal balance as far as article 31 is concerned, the jurisprudence of the ICJ has 
emphasized textual interpretation as a starting point. ‘Interpretation must be based above all 
upon the text of the treaty’, the Court says, but of course the words of the text must be given 
their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. Regard must also be had to 
the spirit and purpose of the instrument being interpreted as well as the intention of the 
contracting parties.217 Since the text of a treaty is, all things considered, the first priority of the 
interpreter, it is of particular relevance to the following reading of the three treaties that the 
VCLT expressly likens the preamble of a treaty to the actual substance of its articles218. The 
following reading, then, insofar as the rules of the VCLT are concerned, will take the 
preambles of the treaties duly into account. 
However, for our present purposes it is not enough to simply read the treaties in accordance 
with article 31 of the VCLT. We are interested in the ethics of international animal law, and 
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nothing in the VCLT seems to place any emphasis on divining what moral principles inspired 
a particular treaty or what the moral implications of its provisions are. The generally accepted 
rules of treaty interpretation do allow us to learn what states must (or must not) do to 
discharge their obligations under a treaty, but the moral implications of these obligations can 
only be understood when assessed against the theoretical framework developed in chapters II 
and III. 
Consequently, the approach taken in the sections below can be described in the following 
terms. I will begin each section by outlining some of the most important and outstanding 
issues and characteristics specific to each of the three spheres of international animal law. 
Once this task has been completed, I will identify and describe those provisions of the three 
selected treaties that are directly relevant to the approach described at the beginning of 
chapter II, that is, how a particular instrument perceives an animal and the manner in which 
they are to be treated. This means that my analysis will take at face value or exclude altogether 
many provisions international legal scholarship would ordinarily be interested in (insofar as the 
attempt would be to comprehensively describe a treaty). As I see it, rules that, for example, set 
up organs specific to a treaty regime or describe in detail how compliance is to be enforced or 
disputes resolved have no direct bearing on how these treaties perceive animals or their 
acceptable treatment. As such, the focus of my interpretation lies (only) with those rules that 
are essential for understanding the moral implications of these instruments. 
Having described the relevant provisions, the focus shifts to the assessment of their moral 
implications. This is achieved by contrasting the rules to the moral and legal positions 
described in chapters II and III. In line with what was said in chapter II, where I made no 
attempt to argue which moral position is the most feasible or conforms best to some assumed 
standard, the purpose here is not to present a moralist critique of the law but to merely expose 
its attitude and thus enable its critique. The end result, this is the aim, is an understanding of 
how a particular sphere of regulation conceives animals and where it draws the line between 
permissible and impermissible treatment. The concluding chapter will draw the separate 
spheres together and assess the moral implications of international animal law taken as a 
whole. 
The law of natural resources 
‘Before 1900’, writes Edith Brown Weiss, ‘there were few multilateral or bilateral agreements 
concerning international environmental issues.’ What little regulation existed was based on the 
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idea of unbridled sovereignty of states over the natural resources of the world.219 In a 1962 
resolution, the United Nations General Assembly stressed the ‘inalienable right to all States 
freely to dispose of their natural wealth and resources in accordance with their national 
interests’ and urged states to respect mutually each other’s sovereignty in this regard220. Two 
years earlier, it had called for similar respect when adopting a resolution promoting the 
economic development of less-developed countries221. 
While, perhaps, there once was an unlimited prerogative to exploit, the long-term 
development of the law has seen to considerable limitations to this right222. Since the branch 
of international environmental law (in any modern sense) began to develop in the 1970’s, 
hundreds of legal instruments pertaining to environmental issues have been adopted223. Today, 
it is axiomatic that development has to be sustainable, utilization equitable, procedures 
predicated on the best available technology, and so on. In many ways, the general spirit and 
the environmental sensibilities of modern international law are encapsulated in the ICJ’s 
advisory opinion on nuclear weapons, where the Court observed that 
[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to 
the environment224[,] 
although in this regard the Court merely codified what had already been in development since 
the first half of the 20th century225. 
That said, contemporary international environmental law is still markedly anthropocentric. 
The 1972 Stockholm declaration, one of the founding documents of the discipline226, stressed 
the need to safeguard the environment and the natural resources of the earth ‘for the benefit 
of present and future generations’227. The 1992 Rio declaration was even more candid about its 
human bias when it stated that ‘[h]uman beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable 
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development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.’228 In 
an ‘anthropocentric paradigm’, as Alexander Gillespie would call it, nonhuman entities such as 
animals or the environment will only be protected because of their instrumental value to 
human beings, not because they would have value independently of their utility to others229. 
Whether this human bias of international environmental law has translated to the provisions 
of the UNCLOS concerning fishing is a question we will be in a better position to answer at 
the end of this section. 
Thus far, the discussion has been concerned with natural resources in general, that is, no 
distinction has been made between terrestrial resources, on the one hand, and marine 
resources, on the other. Where territorial species dwell within the territory of any particular 
state, they fall entirely under the sovereignty of that state. States’ jurisdiction over marine 
species, however, depends greatly on within which maritime zone such species are found.230 
As a good rule of thumb, the jurisdiction of states is strongest when close to their shores, the 
strength of their claim weakening as we move outward from their territorial waters: exclusive 
ownership transforms into shared ownership. It is easy to see how problems might arise where 
a natural resource is prima facie free to be exploited by anyone. Garrett Hardin’s classical 
formulation of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ applies well to the exploitation of fishing stocks: 
‘free access to a free resource which no one controls and everyone can exploit leads inexorably 
to over-consumption, unrestrained competition, and ultimate ruin for all.’231 
The four Geneva conventions of 1958 marked the first attempt to regulate the exploitation of 
marine resources by treaty law 232 . The Convention on the high seas 233  affirmed that the 
freedom of the high seas includes the freedom of fishing. The only restriction to this freedom 
was that states must have ‘reasonable regard’ to the interests of other states.234 Other than this, 
the convention did not regulate fishing in any greater detail. Its rules, however, were 
supplemented by the Convention on fishing and conservation of the living resources of the 
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high seas235, which contained a number of more precise provisions for the conservation of the 
living resources of the high seas 236 . While these provisions undoubtedly afforded some 
protection to the living resources—various species of fish—themselves, article 2 of the 
convention made clear what the ultimate purpose behind these measures was: 
As employed in this Convention, the expression ‘conservation of the living 
resources of the high seas’ means the aggregate of the measures rendering 
possible the optimum  sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply 
to food and other marine products. Conservation programmes should be formulated 
with a view to securing in the first place a supply of food for human consumption.237 
The UNCLOS entered into force in 1994 and thereby, as between states parties, superseded 
the four Geneva conventions238. Its preamble consists of several recitals giving expression to 
some of the most fundamental values and aims animating its adoption. Among these are the 
desire to promote ‘the equitable and efficient utilization’ and the conservation of the resources 
of the seas and oceans. Another recital emphasizes that the achievement of the convention’s 
goals ‘will contribute to the realization of a just and equitable international economic order 
which takes into account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole’. 
Part II of the UNCLOS deals with the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. The general 
spirit of the regulation of territorial seas is that states are sovereign, and their sovereignty 
extends beyond their land territory to the adjacent belt of sea called the territorial sea, which 
may not exceed 12 nautical miles 239 . While the sovereignty over territorial seas must be 
exercised in accordance with the provisions of the UNCLOS and other rules of international 
law240, part II has very little to say about states’ right to exploit their natural resources. It does 
exclude fishing activities from innocent passage241, and consequently permits a coastal state to 
regulate innocent passage with a view to conserving the living resources of the sea and 
preventing the infringement of its fisheries laws and regulations242, but other than that it does 
not regulate a coastal state’s sovereign prerogative to exploit its natural resources. 
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Some guidance can be found in part XII, however. Whereas states have a sovereign right to 
exploit their natural resources, they have a duty to protect and preserve the marine 
environment243. The scope of this obligation, however, is largely restricted to pollution and 
damage caused to other states—while the convention does require states in this connection to 
take measures ‘necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the 
habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life’, this 
latter obligation does not stand alone, but is rather to be understood in the context of part 
XII, which lays down a detailed regime governing the cooperation of states, monitoring and 
environmental assessment, and national regulation seeking to prevent pollution of the marine 
environment244. Where exploitation does not entail pollution or harm to other states, the 
UNCLOS does not seem to stand in the way of unlimited exploitation as long as it occurs 
within the territorial sea or areas landward thereof. 
It is said that the vast majority of all fish are caught within 200 nautical miles from the coast245. 
Part V of the UNCLOS lays down the regime for so-called exclusive economic zones (‘EEZ’) 
and provides that states may claim an EEZ up to ‘200 nautical miles from the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured246. Within this maritime zone, coastal states 
have ‘sovereign rights’ to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage both living and nonliving 
natural resources of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil247. 
While these rights do not amount to sovereignty proper, they place the coastal state in a 
considerably preferential position in comparison to other states. The coastal state must 
determine the maximum allowable catch of the living resources in its EEZ, and other states 
may exploit these resources only to the extent that the coastal state itself fails to harvest the 
entire allowable catch248. In determining the maximum allowable catch, the coastal state must 
take conservation and management measures to ensure that the living resources of the EEZ 
are not endangered by over-exploitation, that harvested species are maintained or restored to 
levels producing a maximum sustainable yield, and that the reproduction of non-harvested 
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species does not become seriously threatened.249 Since areas now considered EEZ’s were 
previously considered the high seas250, the regime essentially removes most fishing from the 
ambit of high seas freedoms and places it under the control of the coastal state, thereby greatly 
reducing unregulated overfishing—at least in theory.251 
The coastal state, as referred to above, must grant other states access to that surplus of its 
living resources it itself fails to harvest. This is a corollary of the coastal state’s obligation to 
promote the ‘objective of optimum utilization of the living resources’ of the EEZ 252 . 
However, according to article 62(1) this obligation is ‘without prejudice to article 61.’ It 
follows, then, that the objective of optimum utilization is limited by the conservation concerns 
of article 61, not the other way around. Moreover, nothing in articles 61 or 62 is to the effect 
that the maximum allowable catch would need to conform to some minimum level of 
permissible exploitation. It is possible, then—at least in theory—that a coastal state decides on 
a virtually nonexistent total allowable catch in the interests of preserving resources.253 How 
many states would be willing to do so is, of course, a wholly different question. 
Certain stocks are subject to special regulation under part V. Where stocks occur within the 
EEZ’s of multiple states, those states must cooperate to ensure the conservation of such 
stocks 254 . Whereas there now exists an independent treaty on highly migratory species 255 
supplementing what little regulation the UNCLOS contains in this regard, the latter does lay 
down a general obligation to cooperate to ensure conservation and, most importantly, to 
promote the objective of optimum utilization256.  
Of particular importance is the fact that the UNCLOS allows parties to regulate the 
exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than otherwise provided for in part V. 
Notwithstanding the objective of optimum utilization, states may prohibit the taking of 
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marine mammals completely—the UNCLOS, of course, does not itself directly prohibit their 
taking.257 Moreover, article 65 obliges parties to cooperate to conserve marine mammals and, 
insofar as cetaceans are concerned, work through ‘the appropriate international organizations 
for their conservation, management and study.’ This latter obligation has been interpreted by 
many as referring directly to the International Whaling Commission (‘IWC’), thereby 
obligating all member states, regardless of whether they are parties to the International 
convention for the regulation of whaling258, to adhere to its regulations and to accept, most 
importantly, the moratorium on commercial whaling. Some states, however, dispute this 
interpretation, arguing that as the article refers to ‘organizations’ in the plural, parties remain 
free to discharge their obligations through other organizations they consider appropriate.259 
Article 65 also applies to the conservation and management of marine mammals in the high 
seas260. 
Finally, part V regulates so-called anadromous and catadromous species261. As a general rule, 
to which some exceptions apply, anadromous stocks may only be fished in waters landward of 
the outer limits of EEZ’s, that is, they may not be caught in the high seas262. Catadromous 
species are subject to a similar restriction bar the exception: for these species, the prohibition 
of catching in the high seas is not qualified by economic considerations263. 
Finally, we turn to the regime of the high seas. The relevant part of the treaty in this regard is 
part VII, which applies to all parts of the sea all parts of the sea not included in EEZ’s, 
territorial seas, internal waters, or archipelagic waters 264 . Much like its predecessors, the 
UNCLOS declares the high seas open to all states and includes the freedom of fishing in the 
freedom of the high seas, these freedoms restricted by the duty to have ‘due regard’ to the 
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interests of other states265. Whereas all states have the right for their nationals to fish in the 
high seas266, they also have a general obligation to take necessary measures and to cooperate 
with a view to conserving the living resources of the high seas267. Insofar as states elect to set 
catch quotas, they must, again, take measures towards maintaining or restoring populations of 
harvested species in order to produce a maximum sustainable yield and to prevent the 
reproduction of non-harvested species of being seriously threatened268. 
Beyond this, the convention does not specify in any greater detail what it is exactly what states 
must do to discharge these duties. As the bar for conserving the living resources of the high 
seas is thus set remarkably low, states must use their own initiative to cooperate and agree on 
measures and rules concerning various parts of the high seas. It has been noted, however, that 
when states adopt treaties to govern particular fisheries in greater detail, a common problem is 
that non-parties to these arrangements may nonetheless exercise their high seas freedom to 
fish, thereby escaping all those obligations incumbent on the voluntarily consenting states269. 
As Malcolm Evans notes, it is indeed ‘difficult to resist the conclusion that problems of over-
utilization ... will remain until the right to exploit ... is made conditional upon participation in a 
unified international regulatory framework’270. 
Turning to the moral implications of the UNCLOS, the convention, by and large, views 
animals as ‘natural’ and ‘living resources’. This is not prima facie markedly different from the 
fact that domestic law tends to view animals as property, though it is clear that the global 
scale271 of exploiting marine animals as resources goes far beyond any exploitation of animals as 
property within any single state. Still, the characterization of animals as resources is prejudicial 
to any interests or value they might be perceived as having as a matter of morals. ‘Language’, 
Joan Schaffner writes,  
is not neutral but rather shapes our perception of the world ... current terms used 
in the law to describe animals ... are often derogatory and shape our views of 
animals. Terms such as ‘brutes’, ‘dumb creatures’ and ‘pests’ ... denigrate animals 
and prevent the law from adequately accounting for their inherent value ... This 
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terminology implies that their only value is their worth to humans as objects of 
food or research.’272 
While the UNCLOS does not ‘denigrate’ marine animals with any of the terms Schaffner 
mentions, a resource is by its very definition a means to increased utility. Taking this 
characterization together with the human-centered goals listed in the preamble of the 
UNCLOS—their emphasis is, from the outset, on economic considerations and other 
essentially human interests—serves to underline the convention’s anthropocentrism and the 
fact that it regards marine animals as having instrumental value only. If this regime is to have 
any connection to a moral theory, it is certainly not any theory postulating inherent value or 
claiming that animals have rights.  
That said, two exceptions distinguish certain marine animals from the remaining mass 
otherwise treated as mere resources. Firstly, the UNCLOS, as we saw, provides for specific 
rules in regard to the conservation of certain stocks and species, that is, those occurring within 
multiple EEZ’s, the highly migratory, and the anadromous and the catadromous. Whereas the 
main principles of the convention apply to these species and stocks residually (eg the objective 
of optimum utilization), they are nonetheless the beneficiaries of some enhanced cooperation 
and conservation duties. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly in comparison to the general 
spirit of the UNCLOS, marine mammals, cetaceans in particular, enjoy preferential treatment. 
These ‘charismatic megafauna’273, as noted above, are exempt from the general objective of 
optimum utilization and are thus placed in a position much more favorable than the general 
mass of marine animals 274 . In this regard, the UNCLOS blends the boundary between 
international animal law as regulating the use of animals as resources and international animal 
law as protecting and conserving certain species because of their compromised status. It 
would seem that a single regime can, to some extent, participate in both spheres. Still, the fact 
that some stocks and species are mentioned separately in the convention’s provisions does 
little to obscure the fact that they are nonetheless perceived rather instrumentally. 
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Turning from the law’s conception of the animal to their treatment, the moral implications of 
the UNCLOS are, I believe, best understood as a combination of two elements, one being 
what the convention does provide for, the other stressing what it does not regulate. The above 
examination of the UNCLOS’ provisions evidences that there is a great degree of detail in 
how states must reconcile exploitation and conservation in various maritime zones. In fact, 
the convention places such an emphasis on conservation that it would certainly be inaccurate 
to claim that it only embodies a right to exploit. However, for our present purposes—divining 
the moral implications of the law in regard to the treatment of animals—, what becomes truly 
relevant is the cumulative effect of the convention’s provisions. The cumulative effect, I argue, 
amounts to a simple concession that it is permissible for humans to exploit (marine) animals 
as long as this is done sustainably. What the UNCLOS does not regulate, however, is the 
welfare of marine animals. Nothing in its provisions amount to any duty to ensure ‘humane’ 
treatment or abstain from ‘cruelty’. 
If the task, now, is to judge whether the UNCLOS can be reconciled with any particular moral 
or legal theory examined in chapters II and III, the theory of animal welfare (and the 
utilitarianism that animates it) has to be ruled out. While a welfarist conception of 
international animal law as it regulates the use of animals as resources would similarly be 
premised on an idea that it is morally permissible for humans to exploit animals, it would 
nonetheless introduce at least some safeguards to ensure the welfare of the animals involved. 
The UNCLOS places no such constraints on those utilizing the living resources of the seas, 
which leads me to believe that it conforms to something much more primitive than animal 
welfare theory. All things considered, if the UNCLOS would have to be likened to some 
particular moral position, I would be inclined to say that it is peculiarly Aristotelian. It clearly 
holds that humans may use animals—resources—for their benefit, but that seems to be the 
end of the matter. Assuming that the convention can be held representative of that sphere of 
international animal law that takes a macro-level perspective to animals and perceives them as 
resources, exploiting the fish of the world’s oceans and seas is a simple matter of waging a 
‘just war’. 
Protecting endangered species 
Ecosystems are sensitive systems comprising both living and nonliving components that are 
deeply interrelated. Any change to one component may have a drastic influence on other 
components—remove one species completely, and the vitality of the entire ecosystem may be 
63 
jeopardized275. ‘The loss of biodiversity has profound implications for human welfare and for 
the planet’, writes Farhana Yamin. ‘While it is difficult to quantify the actual and potential 
value of biodiversity, it is clear that biodiversity conservation is essential for human existence 
at many different levels.’276 
Animal and plant species have become extinct as long as biological entities have existed. There 
is nothing unnatural about extinction per se, quite the contrary. The current rate and scale of 
extinction, however, is unprecedented.277 More than eight-and-a-half hundred extinctions have 
been recorded during the past 500 years or so, and almost 9 000 animal species are currently 
listed as critically endangered, endangered, or vulnerable to extinction. ‘Humans and human-
related activities have been the main cause of extinctions since 1500 AD’, and the level of 
biological diversity is about to reach an all-time low.278 While the international community 
increasingly believes in the necessity of protecting biological diversity, no legal instrument 
protects all animals on a global basis279. 
Alexander Gillespie has noted that the first treaties seeking to conserve animal species can be 
traced back to the 19th century280. These earliest examples of international conservation law 
were motivated by a need to protect human interests—to such an extent, in fact, that these 
precious human interests were safeguarded by actively culling certain ‘harmful’ species 281 . 
Considering that treaty obligations are premised on the consent of their addressees 282 , 
however, this is relatively understandable. As was discussed above, the branch of international 
environmental law is no older than around four decades by now. Assuming that states were 
not generally sensitive to environmental concerns prior to the 1970’s or so, there certainly had 
to be something in for them to make contracting worthwhile. 
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The sphere of international animal law under scrutiny in this section, as was noted closer to 
the beginning of this chapter, takes an interest in animals as representatives of species. While 
this is the starting point, practical approaches giving effect to this idea vary greatly. The 
CITES, as its very name suggests, focuses on regulating international trade. Some treaties, on 
the other hand, seek not to protect species directly, but by conserving their habitat. The 
Convention on wetlands of international importance especially as waterfowl habitat283, for 
example, obligates parties to designate and promote the conservation of wetlands, which are 
considered integral to the conservation of various species of flora and fauna, waterfowl in 
particular 284 . The CITES is, due both to its approach and its membership, global; the 
Convention for the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources285, on the other hand, 
applies only to a very particular part of the world, as does the Convention on the conservation 
of European wildlife and natural habitats286. A particularly peculiar conservation treaty is the 
Convention on biological diversity287 (‘CBD’), which obligates member states to engage in a 
wide range of measures in order to protect biological diversity. Not only is this treaty more 
holistic in its approach than perhaps any other international legal instrument, it may also be 
the only treaty ever to recognize the ‘intrinsic value’ of anything nonhuman288. 
As a matter of morals as well as politics, some species tend to inspire passion more so than 
others. In line with the concept of ‘charismatic megafauna’ that was referred to above, whales 
are often considered as deserving special consideration and treatment 289 . Whereas some 
attempts to regulate the taking of whales were made as early as under the auspices of the 
League of Nations290, the central instrument governing whaling today is the International 
convention for the regulation of whaling291 adopted in 1946. A historical development under 
the current regime was the introduction of a so-called moratorium on commercial whaling as 
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of the 1985/1986 whaling season, which has continued to this day 292 . The moratorium 
essentially bans all commercial whaling by states parties by setting the commercial catch 
quotas for all species to which the convention applies to zero. In spite of the ban, however, 
the treaty does allow member states to issue permits for killing, taking, and treating whales for 
scientific purposes293, a practice that has resulted in the death of more than 16 000 whales 
since the introduction of the moratorium294. 
There is interesting synergy between the CITES and the whaling convention. The protection 
of a species deemed deserving of it is, at least in theory, considerably improved if a particular 
species falls within the ambit of two (or more) legal instruments. With the exception of the 
West Greenland stock of minke whales, international trade in specimens of whale species 
managed by the IWC is prohibited because all of these species are currently listed in appendix 
I to the CITES295. This is not entirely uncontroversial, however; with the exception of the 
West Greenland stock, appendix I includes all minke whales (Balaenoptera acutorostrata)296, the 
conservation status of which is currently identified as ‘least concern’. It is certainly less 
problematic for the whaling convention to ban the commercial catching of minke whales since 
that convention does not purport to protect endangered species exclusively. But when a treaty 
named ‘Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora’ lists in 
what could be considered its most significant appendix a species that is abundant and nowhere 
near being threatened with extinction, its political credibility is at stake. 
Continuing with the topic of appendices, the CITES is predicated on the idea of placing 
different species in different appendices depending on their degree of endangerment. 
Appendix I is subject to the strictest regulation and includes species ‘threatened with 
extinction which are or may be affected by trade.’297 Appendix II, subject to more relaxed 
standards, includes species that may become threatened with extinction unless trade in them is 
regulated298. The final appendix, appendix III, includes species individual member states have 
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identified as requiring protection within their own jurisdiction299. The CITES is, of course, not 
the only conservation treaty to employ listing of protected species as a core method of 
regulation: other examples include the Convention on the conservation of European wildlife 
and natural habitats300 and the Convention on the conservation of migratory species of wild 
animals301. 
As with the UNCLOS, some of the core values of the CITES, too, can be found it its 
preamble recitals. In keeping with the spirit of the Stockholm declaration, one recital 
recognizes that wild flora and fauna ‘must be protected for this and the generations to come’. 
Another underlines the ‘ever-growing value of wild fauna and flora from aesthetic, scientific, 
cultural, recreational and economic points of view’.  
The main legal obligation of parties to the CITES is to allow trade in listed species only in 
accordance with the provisions of the convention302. This is achieved by requiring various 
permits and certificates, which may only be issued by management authorities the parties are 
obliged to designate. Management authorities work in cooperation with scientific authorities, 
which parties must also designate. 303  Since trade in listed species between parties to the 
convention is dependent on permits and certificates issued by authorities only parties to the 
convention will have established, trade with non-parties is prima facie impossible to reconcile 
with the demands of the CITES. However, it does provide for a mechanism to facilitate such 
trade: as long as non-parties are capable of issuing comparable documentation that 
substantially conforms with the requirements of the convention, parties may accept such 
documents in lieu of the regular permits and certificates they would require from other 
member states304. 
Trade in appendix I species requires both an import and an export permit. An import permit 
may only be issued if the import will be for purposes which are not detrimental to the survival 
of the species involved, the intended recipient of a living specimen is suitably equipped to 
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house and care for it, and the specimen is not used for primarily commercial purposes305. An 
export permit may only be granted following an import permit. In addition, the export of a 
specimen must not be detrimental to the survival of its species, the specimen has to be 
obtained in accordance with the laws concerning protection of fauna and flora of the state of 
export, and a living specimen is so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, 
damage to health, or cruel treatment.306 Re-exporting307 a specimen requires a certificate, which 
may only be granted if the specimen was first imported in accordance with the CITES, a living 
specimen is so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health, or 
cruel treatment, and the intended state of import has granted an import permit 308 . The 
introduction of a specimen from the sea 309 also requires a certificate, which may only be 
granted if the introduction will not be detrimental to the survival of the species involved, the 
intended recipient of a living specimen is suitably equipped to house and care for it, and the 
specimen is not to be used for primarily commercial purposes310. 
The export of appendix II species is subject to requirements identical with appendix I species 
with the exception that import permits are not required311, and the same holds true for the re-
export of appendix II species312. Interestingly, the introduction from the sea of appendix II 
species follows the same rules as appendix I species insofar as the introduction must not be 
detrimental to the survival of the species, but the introduction certificate for appendix II 
species requires that the management authority is satisfied that a living specimen will be so 
handled as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health, or cruel treatment whereas for 
appendix I species it was enough that the authority is satisfied that the intended recipient of a 
living specimen is suitably equipped to house and care for it. Furthermore, the introduction of 
appendix II species for primarily commercial purposes seems not to be prohibited; this, as was 
seen above, is not the case with appendix I species.313  
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Finally, the export of appendix III species requires an export permit, which may be granted 
only where the specimen was obtained in accordance with the laws concerning protection of 
fauna and flora of the state of export and a living specimen is so prepared and shipped as to 
minimize the risk of injury, damage to health, or cruel treatment314. The presentation of an 
export permit is required only where the import is from a state which has included that 
particular species in appendix III, otherwise a mere certificate of origin will do315. As with 
appendix II species, import permits are not required. 
The convention contains a number of exceptions to the articles governing trade in appendix I, 
II, and III species, but none of these are of direct relevance for present purposes. In broad 
terms: articles III–V do not apply to specimens acquired prior to their species being listed in 
any of the appendices or to personal and household effects316;  management authorities may 
waive the requirements of articles III–V as regards specimens used in travelling zoos, circuses, 
menageries, or other exhibitions317 and; specimens bred in captivity are subject to certain 
exceptions318. 
Turning to the CITES’ perception of animals and the moral implications thereof, by listing in 
appendices only those animals having unfavorable conservation status319 and excluding all 
others, it essentially claims that some animals simply matter more. This, of course, raises the 
question whether endangerment is a morally relevant characteristic that justifies better (or 
worse) treatment. If we assume, for argument’s sake, that it is, the situation becomes rather 
paradoxical: it is often, as was discussed at the beginning of this section, human activities that 
bring a species to the brink of extinction (and, unfortunately, beyond). If endangerment would 
be morally relevant so as to necessitate different treatment, it is peculiar how human conduct 
that results in endangerment of a species results in a moral duty to conserve such species—
especially as the opposite seems to be that until a species becomes threatened or endangered, 
there exists no moral duty to conserve. 
So we could take at face value that this sphere of the law, exemplified by CITES, holds that 
members of endangered species have particular moral significance. But there is no reason to 
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believe that this would entail that these individuals and their species would have anything 
beyond instrumental value. A ‘significant feature’ of this sphere of law, as MJ Bowman has 
noted, is that ‘the protection which [the law] extends to animals is accorded to them as 
representatives of a species and primarily on account of the rare, threatened or endangered 
state of the species’—this has already been established. However, as he continues, protection 
‘is not based upon the notion that animals are individual living creatures worthy of respect and 
consideration in their own right.’ 320  As the very preamble of the CITES underlines, the 
purpose of protective measures relates directly to the value of wild fauna and flora ‘from 
aesthetic, scientific, cultural, recreational and economic points of view’. All of these are human 
values: no mention is made of any moral value specimens might be considered to have. The 
conclusion seems to be that not only are animals not equal, but that those deemed worthy of 
protection are worth that protection solely due to their instrumental value to humans. 
As for treatment, while the treaty essentially bans all commercial trade in listed species, it does 
permit non-commercial transactions. From an individual animal’s perspective, this means that 
transportation and related measures are permissible as long as the convention’s provisions—
welfare standards included—are had regard to. The CITES, as noted above, places a 
surprising emphasis on avoiding animals being subjected to injury or cruel treatment. 
However, as David Favre observes, it does not explicitly define what constitutes cruel 
treatment for the purposes of its provisions321. This, as seen in chapter III, is not something 
particular to the CITES: animal welfare theory in general is predicated on flexible language, 
something that nearly always ensures that human interests prevail over the interests of 
animals. 
At this stage it should also be noted that since this sphere of law only applies to select species, 
its provisions are rendered redundant in regard to most animal species in existence. 
Notwithstanding the treaty’s concern for welfare, it is difficult to see how the CITES—or any 
conservation treaty, for that matter—could have more than a peripheral effect on animal 
exploitation as a general matter. In this regard, the fact that the CITES only applies to trade in 
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endangered species limits its scope of application twice: if an animal falls outside this ambit (and 
most animals will), there is indeed little this sphere of conservation law will have to say.322 
The only reasonable conclusion seems to be that CITES gives effect to an peculiar 
interpretation of welfarist theory. If law cannot truly be divorced from morals, as most 
positivists would be willing to concede, then it follows that the provisions of the CITES 
reflect a moral theory according to which it is permissible to use animals as tradable (non-
commercial purposes only) commodities as long as safeguards—freedom from injury and 
‘cruel’ treatment—are in place. But this sphere of the law is indeed a ‘peculiar’ version of 
welfarism. Far from comprehensive, it only applies to a relatively small amount of animals and 
uses, thereby not contributing greatly to any global perspective of animals’ status and 
treatment. 
The international regulation of animal welfare 
Much to the chagrin of compassionate legal scholars, there currently exists no global (legally 
binding) instrument setting standards for animal welfare. This was the case in 1989, when MJ 
Bowman lamented the fact that ‘[t]he present situation [in relation to international animal law] 
leaves much to be desired’, and it continues to burden the mind of David Favre, who only two 
years ago remarked that no international agreement currently ‘ensures the welfare and 
protection of animals.’ 323  A ‘need exists for a truly global instrument with effective 
enforcement procedures’, writes Bowman, and, as we have seen on the title page of this 
chapter, even the eminent Christopher Weeramantry, former judge of the ICJ, has stressed the 
need for the international legal order to develop ‘safeguards and affirmative protection’ for 
nonhuman life324. 
Now, animal welfare legislation is not entirely unproblematic, as we have seen. As Gary 
Francione and his followers would be quick to remind, the law, as it is, treats animals as 
rightless objects that can be sacrificed on the altar of general utility as long as virtually any 
human interest, no matter how insignificant, is satisfied in doing so. But there are other 
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concerns as well, concerns not based on moral considerations, strictly speaking. Stuart Harrop 
and David Bowles note that the domestic industry of states committed to a high standard of 
animal welfare may find it difficult to compete against cheaper imports produced under lower 
welfare standards since higher standards tend to entail higher production costs. ‘In general’, as 
they note, ‘animal welfare costs money.’ 325  Mike Radford shares their worry, adding that 
restrictions targeting foreign low-welfare imports may amount to an unhealthy form of 
cultural imperialism, states attempting to impose their moral beliefs on the rest of the world326. 
According to Gaverick Matheny and Cheryl Leah, preference of economic considerations over 
welfare concerns may simply lead producers to view animal death and low welfare as 
acceptable where improving conditions would be economically less feasible327. 
It is true that economic considerations may significantly hamper attempts to improve welfare, 
especially where the sought improvement is solely ethical in the sense that it tries to secure a 
higher standard of well-being in a manner that is at odds with what would be the most 
economically efficient way to exploit. It is also true, as the conclusion to chapter II serves to 
emphasize, that there are no universally shared moral beliefs in regard to animals. In this 
regard, I could refer to Anghie’s work328 once more, this time in a different manner as at the 
end of chapter III, to reiterate Radford’s point: there is always a price to be paid for 
harmonizing two elements in the image of that one of them we consider better in some way. 
Put differently, harmonizing different cultural or religious morals in the image of enlightened 
European sensibilities is inherently dangerous. We will never know how native American 
(much less African) societies could have developed had they not been subjugated by European 
imperialism. Western animal lawyers would do well to remember this analogy. 
This is not, of course, to say that global animal ethics should be a laissez-faire matter. While I 
have no intention to share or promote my own personal views concerning the ethics of animal 
exploitation in this thesis, suffice to say I am no nihilist. It is certainly possible, perhaps even 
desirable, to exert influence in hopes of reforming humankind’s use of animals for the better. 
Whether this influence should be legal as opposed to, say, political or moral is a different 
matter. 
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At any rate, some activists remain convinced that animal welfare is something that should be 
regulated globally through international law. Sabine Brels believes that a global instrument for 
animal welfare is needed to remedy an ‘unsustainable insecurity in international law’ and ‘to 
provide proper guidance for animal welfare protection’329. David Favre has even drafted an 
example of what such a treaty should look like330. While no treaties to their liking currently 
exist, attempts have been made to adopt instruments akin to the Universal declaration of 
human rights, for example the Universal declaration on animal welfare (‘UDAW’) and the 
Universal declaration of animal rights (‘UDAR’). Neither project, however, has come to 
fruition thus far, and scholars have been critical concerning the content of these declarations 
as well as what practical value they might have.331 There is also a more recent 2011 declaration 
authored by and disseminated among individual activists as opposed to larger organizations332. 
Some similar attempts have taken a narrower scope: a ‘Declaration of rights for cetaceans: 
whales and dolphins’ was pronounced at Helsinki, Finland on 22 May 2010333. 
In spite of the absence of a universal treaty on animal welfare, it is hardly accurate to claim 
that no regulation of welfare exists. In this regard, David Favre is simply wrong: there are 
international agreements that ensure the welfare and protection of animals.334 The CITES, as 
we have seen, makes most permits conditional upon the minimization of risk of injury and 
cruel treatment. The Protocol on environmental protection to the Antarctic treaty335 provides 
that ‘[a]ll taking of native mammals and birds shall be done in the manner that involves the 
least degree of pain and suffering practicable.’336 But it is true that nothing in international law 
currently affords protection to the welfare of all animals. It must be asked, however, how 
many states would be willing to commit to an instrument encompassing uses of animals as 
diverse as, say, companionship, agriculture, scientific research, and entertainment. Not all 
animals are equally sympathetic. Visions of comprehensive regulation of animal use become 
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particularly problematic when they involve animals that are cherished in some parts of the 
world but despised in others. Again, we return to the problematics of cultural imperialism. 
Before turning to the CoE treaty regarding farm animals, which is the intended case study of 
this section, some words have to be said on one pseudo-global mechanism for protecting 
animal welfare. This example also serves to showcase how free trade agreements may 
influence animal welfare, however unintentionally or peripherally. The General agreement on 
tariffs and trade337 (‘GATT’), in broad terms, seeks to remove barriers to international trade by 
obligating parties to treat other contracting states’ exported goods equally and no less 
favorably than they would their own national production338. Much of article III deals with 
what are called ‘like products’. If the prohibition to treat less favorably only applies to 
imported products that are comparable to ‘“like products” of national origin’, it logically 
follows that ‘unlike’ products are exempt from being treated similarly: like cases should be 
treated alike, as the formal principle of justice is sometimes expressed339. The problem is that 
the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) regime has been reluctant to hold high-welfare 
products as being distinguishable from low-welfare products. As long as ‘unethical’ animal 
products are physically identical to the ‘ethical’—that is, imported low-welfare products 
cannot be distinguished from domestic high-welfare ‘like products’—, high-welfare products 
may not be protected at the expense of low-welfare products.340 
Since the heightened moral sensibilities of the people cannot be safeguarded by favoring some 
(usually domestic) products directly, recourse must be had to exceptions. Article XX of the 
GATT, titled ‘general exceptions’, permits parties to adopt and enforce measures necessary to, 
inter alia, protect public morals or human, animal, or plant life or health341. A state could, then, 
as a first option, impose restrictions on low-welfare imports while claiming to protect public 
morals. This may now work, as is evidenced by the fact that as recently as May 2014, the WTO 
Appellate Body observed that a EU ban on seal products based on moral concerns regarding 
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seal welfare was indeed ‘necessary to protect public morals’342. However, it is too early to judge 
whether this decision, in the long run, becomes the rule or remains the exception. In many 
ways, it seems unlikely that a trade-centered regime such as the WTO would allow its 
members to issue blanket bans on whatever might offend the particular moral beliefs of their 
peoples. Besides, what makes seals morally different from factory-farmed cattle? 
Failing the public morals route, the second option would be to restrict trade in low-welfare 
products by subsuming the concept of animal welfare under that of animal health. Here 
matters get a bit more complicated. Article XX(b)  is supplemented by the Agreement on the 
application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures343 (‘SPS agreement’), which has rightfully 
been described as an extension to the article344. The SPS agreement does not prescribe specific 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures—that is, measures taken to protect inter alia animal life 
from contaminants, toxins, pests, and diseases—, it simply lays down the rules according to 
which governments may develop and take such measures themselves 345 . The agreement 
designates the World Organization for Animal Health (‘OIE’) as the standard-setting agency 
in regard to matters pertaining to animal health346. A provision greatly increasing the OIE’s 
influence over global trade is article 3(2) of the SPS agreement, pursuant to which any sanitary 
or phytosanitary measures conforming to the standards of the OIE will be presumed 
consistent with the GATT. Thus, the OIE essentially gets to determine—in the context of 
animal health—what constitutes a justifiable restriction to international trade and what does 
not.  
But what of animal welfare? While the OIE has, since 2004, included animal welfare standards 
in its terrestrial code347, there is no precedent in permitting states to address animal welfare 
concerns through article XX(b) of the GATT. In fact, there is good reason to believe that 
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‘animal health’, as understood by the WTO regime, excludes ‘animal welfare’. Any interest the 
WTO takes in animal health is, many argue, ultimately because of how animal health may 
affect human health.348 It follows that, lacking any precedent to the contrary, animal welfare 
concerns cannot be addressed as matters of animal health under article XX(b) of the GATT. In 
any event, the animal welfare standards of the OIE, in and of themselves, are legally non-
binding and consequently unenforceable 349 . Seemingly, then, states may protect their 
population from ‘unethical’ animal products as a matter of public morals at best: even this, as 
we saw above, is not certain until more states elect to test the limits of article XX(a)  before 
WTO dispute settlement bodies.  
So much for global solutions. The OIE standards lacking legal force, the most widely-ratified 
legally binding international instruments pertaining directly to the welfare of animals have been 
adopted under the auspices of the CoE. Its animal protection conventions were, as was said 
above, the first treaties to lay down ‘ethical principles’ for a variety of animal uses350. These 
agreements have been informed by a belief that respect for animals is part of the cultural 
heritage of European nations, and they are, according to the CoE itself, 
based on the principle that ‘for his own well-being, man may, and sometimes 
must, make use of animals, but that he has a moral obligation to ensure, within 
reasonable limits, that the animal’s health and welfare is in each case not 
unnecessarily put at risk.’351 
Today, these conventions represent some of the most highly-developed animal protection 
instruments in existence, and they have been used in many European states as well as the EU 
as a yardstick for the development of animal legislation352. 
Excluding the European convention for the protection of animals kept for farming 
purposes353 for now, there are five other treaty regimes governing animal use and conservation 
in CoE member states. Two of these, the European convention for the protection of animals 
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for slaughter354 and the Convention on the conservation of European wildlife and natural 
habitats355, have already been referred to in this thesis. The fact that the European convention 
for the protection of pet animals356 takes companion animals as its focus serves to underline 
the peculiarity but also the progressive character of the CoE’s contribution to international 
animal law—no other treaties with a similar scope of application currently exist. The CoE 
arsenal also regulates animal testing through the European convention for the protection of 
vertebrate animals used for experimental and other scientific purposes357. Finally, while its 
predecessor was adopted as early as 1968, international logistics is now governed by the 
European convention for the protection of animals during international transport (revised)358. 
The European convention for the protection of animals kept for farming purposes359 is said to 
have been inspired greatly by the German Animal Protection Law of 1972360. Furthermore, the 
committee responsible for its drafting expressly intended for it to be based on ‘ethical 
principles’.361 The convention applies, as its preamble also affirms, to the ‘keeping, care and 
housing of animals, and in particular to animals in modern intensive stock-farming systems.’ It 
goes on to define ‘animals’ as those ‘bred or kept for the production of food, wool, skin or fur 
or for other farming purposes’ whereas ‘modern intensive stock-farming systems’ are ‘systems 
which predominantly employ technical installations operated principally by means of 
automatic processes.’ 362  The convention’s particular interest in factory farming is 
understandable: as we saw at the very beginning of this thesis363, the often appalling living 
conditions of animals in intensive agriculture have made the practice a sworn enemy of the 
animal liberation movement. According to the convention’s explanatory report, the possibility 
of extending its scope beyond farms to all animals was on the table, but the idea was 
ultimately dropped by the drafting committee364. 
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The main provisions of the convention in regard to animal welfare are articles 3 to 7 whose 
principles parties must give effect to365. Animals must be housed and provided with food, 
water, and care. This rule, as are most provided in articles 3–7, is species-sensitive in that the 
housing and provision must be appropriate to the ‘physiological and ethological needs’ of the 
animal, which is further sensitive to scientific knowledge.366 Restricting animals’ freedom of 
movement in a manner that results in ‘unnecessary suffering or injury’ is prohibited 367 . 
Continuous and regular tethering and confinement, however, is permitted as long as 
‘appropriate’ space is ensured368. 
Article 5 turns to the general living conditions of farm animals. The lighting, temperature, 
humidity, air circulation, ventilation, and other environmental conditions where animals are 
housed must conform to the convention’s flexible standard of an animal’s ‘physiological and 
ethological needs in accordance with established experience and scientific knowledge’. 369 
Provision of food or liquid in a manner or containing substances that may cause unnecessary 
suffering or injury is proscribed370. Finally, article 7 concerns duties to inspect. The condition 
and state of health of animals must be inspected at appropriate intervals to avoid unnecessary 
suffering. While the appropriate interval is not defined for ‘regular’ farm animals, those 
involved in factory farms must be inspected at least once a day.371 Technical equipment used 
in factory farms must also be inspected at least once a day, and any discovered defects must be 
remedied in short order. Where defects cannot be remedied without delay, all necessary 
interim measures must be taken to safeguard the welfare of animals involved.372 
Apart from articles 8 and 9, which will be discussed momentarily, the remainder of the treaty 
is largely irrelevant for present purposes. The only prima facie interesting fact is that the treaty 
remains open to states not parties to the CoE373 . This provision has served no practical 
purpose, however: in the over 35 years that the convention has been in force and membership 
of non-CoE states thus possible, no such state has ratified the convention or acceded to it. Of 
some note is also the fact that there is an optional protocol to the treaty, the Protocol of 
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amendment to the European convention for the protection of animals kept for farming 
purposes374, which, inter alia, amends article 7 of the treaty to provide rules concerning the 
killing of animals on a farm 375 . However, since the entry into force of the protocol is 
conditional upon all of the members to the main treaty becoming parties to the 
aforementioned376, its failure to secure support has now continued for over two decades. 
Since the convention is relatively short and general in its language, it is significant that a 
standing committee, an organ set up by the treaty377, is empowered to adopt recommendations 
containing more detailed provisions in regard to the implementation of the principles378. The 
recommendations of the standing committee are binding upon the states parties: in 
accordance with article 9(3), parties ‘shall either implement’ them, or inform the committee 
through notifying the Secretary-General of the CoE of the reasons they have failed to do so.379 
However, article 9 contains an interesting backdoor essentially seeing to it that even a 
relatively inconsequential minority of member states may veto recommendations of the 
standing committee. If either two or more states parties or the European Economic 
Community (now EU) use the notification procedure of article 9(3) to notify their decision 
not to implement or no longer to implement a recommendation, that recommendation loses 
its legal effect.380 
The standing committee has been remarkably proliferous with its recommendations. The 
oldest recommendation currently in force dating back to 1988, 12 recommendations are 
currently binding upon states parties to the convention and hand out more detailed provisions 
in regard to cattle, sheep, goats, domestic fowl, ratites, domestic ducks and geese, Muscovy 
ducks, fur animals, turkeys, pigs, and farmed fish.381 Recommendations generally begin with a 
preamble, then describe the biological characteristics of the type of animal(s) in question. They 
then turn to more concrete provisions. The recommendation concerning farmed fish, for 
example, regulates in greater detail the amount and training of personnel involved in farming, 
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physical characteristics of enclosures, and the transportation of specimens 382 . The 
recommendation on fur animals also regulates the usual objects such as inspections, 
enclosures, and management, but adds that animals belonging to species incapable of adapting 
to captivity without welfare problems may not be kept for their fur383. The housing of pigs, 
under another recommendation, is subject to detailed rules listed in appendices to the relevant 
instrument 384 . Finally, the recommendation concerning domestic fowl, in an appendix, 
provides for rules similar to the permissible methods listed in the American Veterinary 
Medical Association’s euthanasia guidelines385 as it regulates the killing of unwanted goslings 
and embryos in hatcheries386. 
In some ways, it could be argued that the structure of this chapter and the choice of treaty in 
this section have pre-judged the outcome: a treaty regulating animal welfare is, of course, more 
or less obviously animated by animal welfare theory. Yet it is one thing to hypothesize ex ante, 
another to methodically interpret an instrument against a background of characteristics 
familiar from incarnations of welfarist theory in animal ethics and animal law. The European 
convention for the protection of animals kept for farming purposes is, by and large, 
representative of animal welfare theory. But if anything, this section has served to discuss 
some of the dark sides of attempting to set global standards for the ‘ethical’ treatment of 
animals. As we saw, most attempts to do so have failed to come to fruition, and there are 
significant risks of cultural and religious clashes in trying to enforce globally what are largely 
Western moral ideas and sensibilities. 
It would be a moot point to ask whether the European treaty is reconcilable with animal rights 
theory: of course it is not. The very premise of regulating the treatment of animals in factory 
farms is that it is prima facie permissible to involve animals in such conditions. Nothing about 
the treaty suggests aims grander than maintaining a relatively high standard of welfare while 
animals are used instrumentally as means to human ends. This in spite of the fact that some 
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theorists—which Gary Francione would term ‘new welfarists’—continue to argue that animal 
welfare reform will, in the long run, result in the realization of animal rights387. 
The explanatory report to the treaty tells us that the drafting committee ‘endeavoured to 
elaborate principles which are precise enough to prevent a completely free interpretation, but 
wide enough to allow for different needs.’388 This conviction gives rise to one interesting 
implication. The treaty, as noted above, places much emphasis on the ‘physiological and 
ethological needs’ of different species. These needs, in turn, are assessed in the light of 
‘established experience and scientific knowledge’.389 Now, if the physiological and ethological 
needs of animals are judged on the basis of established experience and scientific knowledge, 
then the basis for judgment is inherently susceptible to evolution. New ‘best practices’ 
develop, science continues to find new explanations for how the world functions. But if 
anything, most if not all of scientific research pertaining to animals has only served to 
emphasize the similarities between humans and animals, that is, animals, too, are capable of 
experiencing pain, suffering, distress, and other unenjoyable mental states. Assuming scientific 
knowledge increasingly tells us that our treatment of animals is not without consequences to 
them, what will the implications of this be? Will the interpretation of ‘physiological and 
ethological needs’, too, increasingly take into account that some practices are inherently 
conducive to unfavorable mental states in spite of the standard of welfare being ostensibly 
high? 
The conclusion is that the European convention for the protection of animals kept for 
farming purposes, understood as representative of the sphere of animal welfare law, is largely 
in accordance with the core principles of animal welfare theory. It perceives animals as 
individuals subordinate to humans, ones that may be used exclusively as means provided 
inhumane and cruel treatment is proscribed390. Assuming the instrument examined here is a 
paradigm of international animal law as it governs the treatment of individual animals, then 
this sphere of the law shares the allegedly European belief that ‘to inflict cruelty upon an 
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animal—either voluntarily or through lack of care—is morally wrong and should be 
punished.’391 
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V CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis began by asking what the ethics of international animal law are: does the law 
conform to moral theories pertaining to animals, and if it does, which theories and how? To 
answer this question, a framework had to be developed. Examining how moral philosophy 
and legal theories have approached the question of the animal, a vocabulary was developed to 
read international animal law in order to discover its moral implications. Moral theories, as 
discussed in chapter II, ranged from theories rejecting the moral value of animals altogether to 
theories positing equality and moral rights. However, it was also noted that in spite of the 
abundance of literature and discussion surrounding animal ethics, no theory enjoys universal 
acceptance. Legal approaches, as explicated in chapter III, ranged from the theory of animal 
welfare to that of animal rights. Yet there were also intermediary approaches, such as attempts 
to formulate theories of legal subjectivity that would apply to animals. Animal welfare theory, 
despite its flaws and shortcomings, is the contemporarily prevalent theory in domestic 
jurisdictions; animal rights theory has thus far failed to result in any state recognizing animals 
as having meaningful legal rights. 
The theoretical framework fully developed, we turned to a case study of international animal 
law. International animal law, understood broadly as any international legal regulation 
pertaining to animals, is not reducible to a single, unified set of rules and principles governing 
animal use. Comprising phenomena as different as the utilization of the natural resources of 
the marine environment and the treatment of animals in agriculture, this body of law 
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encompasses a wide range of human behavior relating to many species of animals and many 
ways in which human conduct has consequences to the welfare and interests of animals. While 
there is prima facie little such a wide range of practices could have in common, certain 
characteristics have emerged as common denominators. 
Law can always be systematized in one way or another. We could ask, for example, which 
formal source its norms flow from: treaties; the practice of states; ‘general principles of law’, 
perhaps? The approach taken in this thesis has been about systematizing in accordance with 
perspective—sense of scale, to be more exact. This division, I argue, best captures the 
relationship between a choice of perspective and the moral implications that follow.  
In keeping with how different human uses of a single animal are subject to different legal 
characterizations and regulation in domestic jurisdictions, international animal law, in broad 
terms, can be understood as comprising three spheres of regulation, all of which differ in how 
they construe the animal. One sphere of the law regulates the use and management of the 
natural resources of the planet, both terrestrial and marine. This sphere, represented by the 
United Nations convention on the law of the sea in this thesis, understands animals as natural, 
living, or biological resources. This body of law, as we saw, has developed considerably since 
the introduction of international environmental law, and today most rules that permit 
exploitation are counterbalanced by duties to conserve and ensure sustainability. Still, 
‘sustainable’ condenses well the core aims of regulation in this sphere: it is permissible, in fact 
necessary, for humans to exploit the natural resources of the planet, animals included, as long as 
this is done in a manner that does not compromise future availability of these same resources. 
This sphere of the law, as it views animals as resources, is markedly insensitive to any belief 
that animals could have value independently of their utility to humans. While some exceptions 
to this rule exist, such as the differential treatment of marine mammals, most animals are seen 
as having instrumental value only. Moreover, when the law considers animals as nothing more 
than ‘resources’, it fails to ensure even a minimal standard of well-being by regulating the 
manner in which these resources must be exploited. Nothing in the UNCLOS or elsewhere in 
the law as it regulates human use of natural resources is to the effect that the treatment of 
these resources should be ‘humane’ or respectful in any other way. This serves to underline 
that fish, perhaps because of how they are exploited in bulk, are exempt from the moral 
consideration increasingly being afforded to domesticated terrestrial animals. All things 
considered, the moral implications of this sphere of the law were noted to be markedly 
84 
Aristotelian. Animals are clearly inferior to humans—perhaps even altogether insignificant—, 
and the exploitation of animals by humans is just. No side constraints, such as those peculiar 
to animal welfare theory, are present in this sphere. 
A second sphere of international animal law takes an interest in animals as members of certain 
species. This sphere, largely concerned with the protection and preservation of endangered or 
otherwise vulnerable animals, was represented in this thesis by the Convention on 
international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora. The methods of protecting 
animals in this sphere of the law were noted to vary greatly. While the CITES regulates trade 
in endangered species, other instruments may protect the habitats of certain species, address 
the protection of migratory species throughout the range of their movement, or focus solely 
on a single species or group of animals or a very geographically limited area. 
The CITES, and this body of conservation law in general, is premised on the idea that certain 
species of animals should be protected from over-exploitation and other conduct detrimental 
for their survival. The moral implication of this view is that some animals matter more than 
others. Ultimately, however, this body of law takes an interest in the treatment of animals 
because of their value for present and future human generations. If these animals are to have 
any kind of enhanced moral value in this sphere, it is once again predicated on their 
instrumental value. Moreover, this sphere of international animal law is largely peripheral to 
everyday concerns relating to the treatment of animals. Apart from the protection of animal 
habitats, which may manifest in ongoing concern for the environment, the inclusion of only 
those animals that have unfavorable conservation status or are otherwise in need of special 
protection serves to separate this sphere from those practices where humans and animals 
interact the most. While some parts of this law of conservation may take an interest in the 
welfare of individual animals and the standard of their treatment, the fact remains that any 
consequent human obligations trigger only in what are exceptional cases. The conclusion is 
that this sphere of international animal law is animated by ideas that essentially conform to the 
theory of animal welfare, although the effect this theory is given through the law of 
conservation is peculiar and markedly different from how animal welfare theory functions in 
domestic jurisdictions. 
Finally, the third identified sphere of international animal law shifts the focus from resources 
and species to individual animals. This is characteristic to legal instruments that attempt to 
protect animal welfare. As noted, while it is continuously demanded by lawyers and activists 
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alike that international law should comprehensively govern animal welfare, little has 
developed. Apart from welfare treaties, which are rare and mostly a European phenomenon, 
international law’s concern for animal welfare is largely incidental and arises in contexts that 
are far removed from the everyday interaction between humans and animals. One example of 
this is the CITES, where welfare standards only apply to trade in endangered species. Another 
example was that of the WTO regime, where concern for animal welfare may inform states’ 
policy towards imports from states where the standard of animal welfare is low. As noted, the 
GATT may now in principle allow states to ban or otherwise restrict trade in low-welfare 
products as a matter of protecting public morals, thereby imposing their moral beliefs on 
other states and peoples, but it is too early to judge what the long-term impact of the WTO 
Appellate Body’s recent decision in regard to the EU seal ban will be. Apart from protection 
of morals, giving effect to animal welfare concerns as a matter of animal health does not 
currently seem possible in international law. 
As no global, legally binding standards for animal welfare exist, this sphere of international 
animal law was represented by a regional treaty, the European convention for the protection 
of animals kept for farming purposes. Regulating the environment and the conditions in 
which animals are to be kept in animal agriculture, the treaty was concluded to largely 
conform to the theory of animal welfare. It is permissible for humans to treat animals as 
commodities and involve them even in intensive animal farming as long as steps are taken to 
ensure that their treatment is humane and that they are not subjected to unnecessary suffering 
or injuries. 
Drawing these three spheres together now, it is obvious that, as a matter pertaining to the 
research question of this thesis, there is no single ethics of international animal law. As the 
analysis taken throughout this thesis has served to underline, there is considerable variety in 
how contemporary human societies exploit animals for various purposes. It follows that there 
is also considerable variety in the moral implications of international law as it currently 
regulates the treatment of animals. The law pertaining to the use of natural resources is largely 
premised on human dominance over nonhuman life and is relatively free from moral concern 
to animals. The law of conservation holds some animals to matter more than others, but is not 
truly concerned with the moral aspects of animal treatment. If anything, its moral concern is 
for future generations’ ability to enjoy from the aesthetic and other values associated with 
species now vulnerable to extinction. And international animal welfare law, if such a thing can 
be claimed to exist, is currently too sporadic to set global standards for the ethical treatment 
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of animals as a general matter. Even if it could, would it amount to anything more than a 
global statement of a largely Western philosophical idea that animals may be exploited as long 
as the ends justify the means? 
Chapter III concluded that there is currently nothing in domestic jurisdictions suggesting that 
even some animals would have meaningful legal rights. We may now conclude the same about 
international animal law. The only moral implication that all of international animal law seems 
to share is that it holds animals valuable only in relation to their utility: animals have 
instrumental value, and such value only. It is obvious that animals do not have legal rights 
under international law. What seems to follow from the analysis of international animal law as 
a whole is that they do not have inherent value or moral rights either. 
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